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   1	  
Chapter	  1:	  An	  Introduction	  to	  U.S.	  Intervention	  in	  Latin	  America	  
	  
“The	  United	  States	  is	  practically	  sovereign	  on	  this	  continent,	  and	  its	  fiat	  is	  law	  upon	  the	  
subjects	  to	  which	  it	  confines	  its	  interposition.”1	  –	  Secretary	  of	  State	  Richard	  Olney,	  1895	  
	  
	   Why	  has	  the	  United	  States	  frequently	  intervened	  in	  the	  affairs	  of	  Latin	  American	  
governments?	  	  How	  have	  the	  motivations	  changed	  over	  time,	  and	  how	  have	  they	  stayed	  
the	  same?	  	  Are	  American	  Presidents	  more	  motivated	  by	  economic	  or	  political	  threats	  to	  
hegemony?	  	  What	  methods	  has	  the	  United	  States	  used	  to	  maintain	  its	  dominance	  over	  
the	  Western	  Hemisphere,	  and	  how	  have	  they	  changed?	  
This	  paper	  seeks	  to	  address	  all	  of	  these	  questions,	  using	  a	  full	  historical	  
examination	  as	  well	  as	  the	  case	  study	  of	  Salvador	  Allende’s	  Chile.	  	  Drawing	  upon	  
numerous	  scholars’	  work	  as	  well	  as	  individual	  research	  and	  investigation,	  this	  paper	  
seeks	  to	  prove	  the	  following	  hypotheses:	  Since	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  Monroe	  Doctrine,	  
which	  marked	  America’s	  entry	  into	  regional	  foreign	  affairs	  as	  a	  major	  player,	  the	  United	  
States	  has	  acted	  upon	  a	  self-­‐created	  moral	  imperative	  and	  entitlement	  to	  dominate	  the	  
Americas.	  	  The	  motivation	  behind	  the	  indispensable	  maintenance	  of	  hegemony	  is	  as
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  George	  C.	  Herring,	  From	  Colony	  to	  Superpower:	  U.S.	  Foreign	  Relations	  Since	  1776.	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  
University	  Press,	  2008),	  307.	  
2	  
	  
	   	   	  
much	  symbolic	  as	  concrete.	  	  Many	  factors	  such	  as	  the	  threat	  of	  communism	  or	  
European	  influence	  have	  been	  used	  as	  justification	  for	  American	  meddling.	  	  In	  fact,	  the	  
main	  motivations	  are	  economic	  control	  of	  the	  hemisphere	  and	  the	  perception	  of	  
American	  ideological	  supremacy	  among	  Latin	  American	  people	  (most	  importantly	  
political	  leaders),	  not	  the	  spread	  of	  democracy	  or	  the	  promotion	  of	  human	  rights.	  	  
Earlier	  in	  the	  United	  States’	  history,	  military	  intervention	  was	  more	  commonly	  used	  to	  
achieve	  the	  aforementioned	  goals.	  	  With	  the	  onset	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  covert	  operations,	  
equally	  potent,	  became	  increasingly	  prevalent.	  	  The	  following	  chapters	  present	  a	  story	  
of	  the	  United	  States	  constantly	  positioning	  itself	  to	  be	  in	  the	  sole	  position	  of	  dominance	  
(economic,	  political,	  and	  ideological)	  in	  the	  region	  of	  the	  Americas.	  
	  
	   The	  foundation	  for	  much	  of	  the	  United	  States’	  foreign	  policy	  towards	  Latin	  
America	  has	  historically	  come	  from	  the	  Monroe	  Doctrine,	  a	  policy	  introduced	  in	  1823	  to	  
deter	  European	  interference	  in	  the	  affairs	  of	  the	  New	  World.	  	  This	  doctrine	  also	  ideally	  
granted	  the	  United	  States	  the	  right	  to	  intervene	  in	  the	  affairs	  of	  its	  southern	  neighbors	  
“when	  it	  felt	  that	  its	  interests	  or	  security	  was	  at	  risk.”2	  	  Initially,	  the	  Monroe	  Doctrine	  
was	  well	  received	  by	  the	  Bolivarian-­‐era	  Latin	  American	  people	  and	  governments.	  	  The	  
United	  States	  was	  not	  seen	  as	  a	  major	  military	  power	  at	  that	  time,	  and	  the	  greatest	  
threat	  to	  autonomy	  posed	  to	  most	  of	  the	  western	  hemisphere	  came	  from	  the	  British	  
Empire.	  	  In	  the	  late	  19th	  and	  20th	  century,	  as	  the	  Monroe	  Doctrine	  was	  increasingly	  used	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Clara	  Nieto	  and	  Chris	  Brandt.	  Masters	  of	  War:	  Latin	  America	  And	  United	  States	  Aggression	  From	  The	  
Cuban	  Revolution	  Through	  The	  Clinton	  Years.	  (New	  York:	  Seven	  Stories	  Press,	  2003),	  18.	  
3	  
	  
	   	   	  
as	  justification	  for	  U.S.	  meddling	  in	  Latin	  American	  affairs,	  the	  policy	  drew	  more	  criticism	  
and	  demonization.3	  	  The	  United	  States’	  regional	  power	  had	  already	  begun	  to	  expand	  by	  
the	  1840s	  as	  evidenced	  by	  the	  Texas-­‐Mexican	  War	  and	  the	  resulting	  annexation	  of	  Texas	  
and	  the	  California	  territories	  from	  Mexico.	  	  Yet	  even	  this	  southward	  expansion	  was	  not	  
viewed	  by	  leaders	  further	  south	  as	  a	  cause	  for	  concern.	  	  The	  war	  was	  simply	  seen	  as	  a	  
localized	  boundary	  dispute.4	  
	   The	  ideas	  of	  the	  Monroe	  Doctrine,	  coupled	  with	  the	  philosophy	  of	  Manifest	  
Destiny	  –	  The	  United	  States’	  divine	  mandate	  for	  territorial	  expansion	  –	  evolved	  with	  
each	  proceeding	  presidency.	  	  Theodore	  Roosevelt	  added	  his	  “corollary”	  to	  the	  Monroe	  
Doctrine,	  further	  emphasizing	  the	  United	  States’	  “right”	  and	  “responsibility”	  to	  govern	  
the	  entire	  American	  Continent.	  	  Roosevelt,	  and	  nearly	  every	  president	  after	  him,	  would	  
use	  the	  justification	  that	  American	  intervention	  was	  a	  benevolent	  act,	  a	  sort	  of	  
ideological	  missionary,	  rather	  than	  a	  colonial	  land	  grab.	  	  As	  President	  Roosevelt	  said	  in	  
his	  1904	  State	  of	  the	  Union	  Address:	  
It	  is	  not	  true	  that	  the	  United	  States	  feels	  any	  land	  hunger	  or	  entertains	  any	  
projects	  as	  regards	  the	  other	  nations	  of	  the	  Western	  Hemisphere	  save	  such	  as	  
are	  for	  their	  welfare.	  All	  that	  this	  country	  desires	  is	  to	  see	  the	  neighboring	  
countries	  stable,	  orderly,	  and	  prosperous.	  Any	  country	  whose	  people	  conduct	  
themselves	  well	  can	  count	  upon	  our	  hearty	  friendship.	  If	  a	  nation	  shows	  that	  it	  
knows	  how	  to	  act	  with	  reasonable	  efficiency	  and	  decency	  in	  social	  and	  political	  
matters,	  if	  it	  keeps	  order	  and	  pays	  its	  obligations,	  it	  need	  fear	  no	  interference	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  John	  A.	  Crow.	  The	  Epic	  of	  Latin	  America.	  (Berkeley:	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  1992),	  676-­‐678.	  
4	  Ibid.,	  	  678.	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from	  the	  United	  States.	  Chronic	  wrongdoing,	  or	  an	  impotence	  which	  results	  in	  a	  
general	  loosening	  of	  the	  ties	  of	  civilized	  society,	  may	  in	  America,	  as	  elsewhere,	  
ultimately	  require	  intervention	  by	  some	  civilized	  nation,	  and	  in	  the	  Western	  
Hemisphere	  the	  adherence	  of	  the	  United	  States	  to	  the	  Monroe	  Doctrine	  may	  
force	  the	  United	  States,	  however	  reluctantly,	  in	  flagrant	  cases	  of	  such	  
wrongdoing	  or	  impotence,	  to	  the	  exercise	  of	  an	  international	  police	  power.5	  
America	  has	  since	  used	  this	  logic	  and	  its	  continuing	  dedication	  to	  the	  Monroe	  Doctrine	  
to	  justify	  nearly	  every	  interaction	  with	  Latin	  America	  on	  a	  foreign	  policy	  level;	  further	  
stretching	  the	  definition	  of	  “loosening	  of	  the	  ties	  of	  civilized	  society,”	  to	  mean	  going	  
against	  American	  strategic	  or	  economic	  desires	  in	  any	  way.	  	  
	   American	  expansionism	  under	  the	  Monroe	  Doctrine	  continued	  under	  President	  
William	  Howard	  Taft.	  	  His	  implementation	  of	  “Dollar	  Diplomacy”	  (defined	  as	  an	  
approach	  to	  diplomacy	  which	  aims	  “to	  create	  stability	  and	  order	  abroad	  that	  would	  best	  
promote	  American	  commercial	  interests”6)	  led	  to	  U.S.	  intervention	  across	  Central	  
America	  and	  the	  Caribbean.	  	  These	  interventions	  were	  intended	  to	  protect	  American	  
economic	  interests	  such	  as	  the	  United	  Fruit	  Company	  and	  the	  Panama	  Canal.	  	  In	  the	  first	  
two	  decades	  of	  the	  20th	  century,	  the	  United	  States	  interfered	  in	  Cuba,	  Puerto	  Rico,	  
Panama,	  Nicaragua,	  Haiti,	  The	  Dominican	  Republic,	  Honduras,	  and	  Mexico.7	  	  Many	  of	  
these	  interventions	  involved	  military	  action,	  and	  even	  occupation.	  	  In	  what	  became	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Theodore	  Roosevelt.	  “State	  of	  the	  Union	  Address.”	  December	  6,	  1904.	  
http://www.teachingamericanhistory.org/library/index.asp?document=1311.	  
6	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  State	  –	  Office	  of	  the	  Historian.	  “Dollar	  Diplomacy,	  1909-­‐1913.”	  
http://history.state.gov/milestones/1899-­‐1913/DollarDiplo.	  
7	  Lester	  D.	  Langley.	  The	  Banana	  Wars:	  United	  Sates	  Intervention	  in	  the	  Caribbean,	  1898-­‐1934.	  
(Wilmington,	  Del.:	  SR	  Books,	  2002).	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known	  as	  the	  Banana	  Wars,	  the	  United	  States	  exerted	  hard	  power	  all	  around	  Latin	  
America	  and	  began	  a	  pattern	  of	  intervention	  that	  would	  continue	  well	  into	  the	  20th	  
century.	  	  For	  example,	  “between	  1853	  and	  1933	  United	  States	  marines	  invaded	  
Nicaragua	  twenty	  times.	  	  In	  one	  case,	  they	  stayed	  five	  years,	  in	  another,	  twenty-­‐one.”8	  	  
American	  intervention	  in	  Nicaragua	  continued	  into	  the	  1990s.	  
By	  the	  time	  Franklin	  D.	  Roosevelt	  took	  presidential	  office	  in	  1933,	  “Central	  
America	  and	  the	  Caribbean	  had	  already	  endured	  more	  than	  a	  hundred	  military	  
interventions	  and	  territorial	  occupations.”9	  	  Roosevelt	  was	  a	  staunch	  anti-­‐imperialist	  
and	  isolationist	  (as	  evidenced	  by	  his	  signing	  of	  three	  neutrality	  acts	  in	  1935,	  1936,	  and	  
1937,	  as	  well	  as	  his	  rejection	  of	  a	  currency	  agreement	  during	  the	  1933	  London	  Economic	  
Conference).10	  	  Roosevelt	  executed	  a	  near	  turnaround	  in	  U.S.	  foreign	  policy	  towards	  
Latin	  America	  with	  the	  Good	  Neighbor	  policy.	  	  Roosevelt	  rescinded	  the	  Platt	  
Amendment,	  granting	  Cuba	  slightly	  more	  control	  over	  its	  own	  politics	  and	  withdrawing	  
American	  troops	  from	  the	  Island	  (though	  Guantánamo	  base	  remained	  open).	  	  He	  also	  
notably	  signed	  agreements	  with	  Panamanian	  President	  Arnulfo	  Arias	  ceding	  sovereignty	  
of	  the	  Panama	  Canal	  and	  isthmus	  as	  well	  as	  removing	  clauses	  granting	  the	  U.S.	  a	  “right”	  
of	  intervention	  in	  Panamanian	  affairs.	  	  As	  the	  events	  that	  led	  to	  the	  start	  of	  World	  War	  II	  
unfolded,	  Latin	  America	  even	  proved	  to	  be	  a	  valuable	  military	  ally	  of	  the	  United	  States.	  	  
Roosevelt	  also	  participated	  in	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  Conference	  for	  the	  Maintenance	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Clara	  Nieto	  and	  Chris	  Brandt.	  Masters	  of	  War.	  128.	  
9	  Ibid.,	  22.	  
10	  Justus	  D.	  Doenecke	  and	  Mark	  A.	  Stoler.	  Debating	  Franklin	  D.	  Roosevelt's	  Foreign	  Policies,	  1933-­‐1945.	  (	  
Lanham:	  Rowman	  &	  Littlefield	  Publishers,	  2005),	  119-­‐120.	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Peace,	  held	  in	  1936	  in	  Buenos	  Aires.	  	  Among	  the	  conference’s	  outcomes	  was	  the	  
Declaration	  of	  Principles	  for	  Inter-­‐American	  Solidarity	  and	  Cooperation,	  which	  ensured	  
coordinated	  defense	  policies	  among	  the	  nations	  of	  the	  Americas	  as	  well	  as	  a	  safeguard	  
against	  United	  States	  interventionism.	  11,	  12	  	  
Though	  Roosevelt’s	  policies	  did	  signal	  a	  retreat	  from	  the	  aggressive	  Monroe	  
Doctrine	  of	  years	  past,	  many	  in	  Latin	  America	  still	  criticized	  the	  president’s	  actions.	  	  
Mexican	  writer	  Jesús	  Silva	  Herzog	  said	  of	  Roosevelt’s	  reforms,	  	  
The	  Good	  Neighbor	  policy	  is	  a	  change	  of	  form	  rather	  than	  content…	  	  Imperialism,	  
an	  economic	  phenomenon,	  the	  inevitable	  and	  legitimate	  offspring	  of	  capitalism,	  
will	  never	  cease	  to	  be	  a	  constant	  threat	  and	  growing	  evil	  for	  the	  progress	  of	  the	  
majority	  of	  nations.13	  
Indeed,	  non-­‐intervention	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  military	  did	  not	  stop	  American	  corporations	  
from	  expanding	  and	  extracting	  across	  Latin	  America.	  	  If	  anything,	  the	  increased	  trust	  
created	  by	  Roosevelt’s	  reforms	  allowed	  for	  more	  U.S.	  investment	  and	  economic	  
entrenchment.	  	  Furthermore,	  in	  response	  to	  the	  commencement	  of	  World	  War	  II	  and	  
the	  growing	  strategic	  importance	  of	  the	  Panama	  Canal,	  the	  United	  States	  installed	  
military	  bases	  on	  the	  British	  Caribbean	  possessions	  of	  Antigua,	  Santa	  Lucía,	  Jamaica,	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  Clara	  Nieto	  and	  Chris	  Brandt.	  Masters	  of	  War.	  22-­‐23.	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  Philip	  C.	  Jessup.	  “The	  Inter-­‐American	  Conference	  for	  the	  Maintenance	  of	  Peace,”	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  American	  Journal	  
of	  International	  Law,	  Vol.	  31,	  No.	  1	  (1937):	  88.	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  Alonso	  Aguilar	  and	  Asa	  Zatz.	  Pan-­‐Americanism	  from	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  to	  the	  Present:	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  View	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  the	  Other	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  Press,	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British	  Guyana,	  Trinidad	  and	  Tobago,	  and	  Turks	  and	  Caicos.	  	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  American	  
bases	  in	  Panama,	  Puerto	  Rico,	  and	  Cuba	  remained	  open.14	  
	   	   Soon	  after	  World	  War	  II	  had	  ended,	  and	  President	  Roosevelt	  had	  died,	  the	  seeds	  
of	  the	  Cold	  War	  were	  sown.	  	  At	  the	  time,	  the	  immediate	  perceived	  threat	  of	  
Communism	  was	  confined	  to	  Europe,	  but	  it	  would	  soon	  spread	  across	  the	  world.	  	  In	  
1947,	  President	  Harry	  Truman	  enacted	  the	  Truman	  Doctrine,	  which	  many	  scholars	  
attribute	  to	  signifying	  the	  start	  of	  the	  Cold	  War.15	  	  Truman,	  in	  his	  speech	  introducing	  this	  
new	  policy,	  coined	  the	  modern	  term	  “the	  Free	  World”,	  and	  claimed	  that	  the	  United	  
States	  had	  an	  obligation	  to	  protect	  the	  Free	  World	  from	  communism:	  “The	  free	  peoples	  
of	  the	  world	  look	  to	  us	  for	  support	  in	  maintaining	  their	  freedoms.	  If	  we	  falter	  in	  our	  
leadership,	  we	  may	  endanger	  the	  peace	  of	  the	  world.	  And	  we	  shall	  surely	  endanger	  the	  
welfare	  of	  this	  nation.”16	  	  Essentially,	  the	  Truman	  Doctrine	  signified	  a	  globalization	  of	  
the	  Monroe	  Doctrine,	  proclaiming	  an	  American	  burden	  and	  right	  to	  ensure	  its	  views	  
were	  held	  and	  maintained	  worldwide.	  
The	  proclamation	  of	  the	  Truman	  Doctrine	  ushered	  in	  the	  era	  of	  McCarthyism.	  	  
Anti-­‐communist	  fervor	  engulfed	  the	  United	  States,	  and	  U.S.	  foreign	  policy	  placed	  its	  
primary	  emphasis	  on	  a	  containment	  approach,	  deviating	  from	  its	  previous	  precedent	  of	  
détente.	  	  From	  this	  point	  until	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  U.S.	  foreign	  policy	  –	  towards	  
Latin	  America	  and	  elsewhere	  –	  was	  strictly	  viewed	  through	  the	  prism	  of	  the	  Cold	  War.	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  Clara	  Nieto	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  Chris	  Brandt.	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  24.	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  Fraser	  J.	  Harbutt.	  The	  Cold	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  (Malden,	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While	  the	  U.S.	  was	  using	  financial	  incentives	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  fragile	  states	  of	  Greece	  
and	  Turkey	  steered	  away	  from	  communism,	  the	  Truman	  administration	  also	  undertook	  
efforts	  to	  secure	  a	  hemispheric	  bulwark	  against	  ‘red’	  expansion.	  	  In	  1947,	  Truman	  signed	  
the	  Inter-­‐American	  Treaty	  of	  Reciprocal	  Assistance,	  a	  mutual	  defense	  pact	  among	  nearly	  
every	  nation	  in	  the	  Western	  Hemisphere.	  	  The	  following	  year,	  the	  Organization	  of	  
American	  States	  (OAS)	  was	  founded.	  	  The	  OAS	  charter	  overtly	  lays	  out	  its	  anti-­‐
communist	  intentions.	  	  The	  motto	  of	  the	  organization	  is,	  “Democracy	  for	  peace,	  
security,	  and	  development,”	  and	  one	  of	  the	  stated	  goals	  in	  Article	  2	  of	  the	  charter	  is,	  “To	  
promote	  and	  consolidate	  representative	  democracy,	  with	  due	  respect	  for	  the	  principle	  
of	  nonintervention.”17	  	  Truman	  also	  signed	  the	  Mutual	  Military	  Assistance	  Pacts	  (MAP)	  
with	  thirteen	  countries	  in	  Latin	  America	  and	  the	  Caribbean.	  	  With	  these	  accords,	  the	  
U.S.,	  “provided	  training	  for	  officers	  and	  weapons	  for	  the	  defense	  of	  the	  hemisphere,”18	  
and	  more	  importantly	  for	  the	  defense	  against	  communism.	  
	   It	  is	  also	  important	  to	  note	  that	  most	  of	  the	  signees	  of	  these	  pacts	  were	  military	  
dictators	  allied	  with	  the	  U.S.19	  	  However,	  this	  was	  a	  relatively	  recent	  development	  in	  the	  
ever-­‐persistent	  pendulum	  between	  authoritarianism	  and	  populist	  movements	  in	  Latin	  
America.	  	  During	  World	  War	  II,	  the	  U.S.	  under	  Roosevelt	  supported	  democratization	  and	  
anti-­‐oligarchic	  movements	  throughout	  Latin	  America.	  	  His	  idea	  of	  a	  “New	  Deal	  for	  the	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  27.	  
9	  
	  
	   	   	  
world”	  sparked	  a	  wave	  of	  democratic	  optimism	  during	  this	  period.20	  	  In	  combination	  
with	  this	  sentiment,	  the	  Soviet-­‐American	  cooperation	  of	  the	  time	  led	  to	  a	  moderation	  of	  
international	  policy	  on	  the	  part	  of	  Stalin.	  	  As	  Hal	  Brands	  explained:	  	  
In	  hopes	  of	  improving	  relations	  with	  the	  Grand	  Alliance,	  Soviet	  dictator	  Josef	  
Stalin	  disbanded	  the	  Comintern	  and	  instructed	  international	  communist	  parties	  
to	  adhere	  to	  a	  popular	  front	  strategy.	  	  Faithful	  to	  Stalin’s	  orders,	  Latin	  America’s	  
communists	  moderated	  their	  policies	  and	  forged	  alliances	  with	  other	  popular	  
parties,	  adding	  breadth	  to	  antidictatorial	  movements.21	  
The	  potent	  combination	  of	  American	  support	  and	  newfound	  unification	  led	  to	  a	  
coordinated	  attack	  on	  dictatorships	  across	  Latin	  America.	  	  As	  authoritarian	  regimes	  fell,	  
newly	  elected	  governments	  instituted	  land	  and	  labor	  reforms,	  created	  new	  social	  
security	  programs,	  and	  expanded	  political	  rights	  to	  the	  historically	  disenfranchised.	  	  
There	  was	  a	  sense	  of	  optimism	  across	  Latin	  America,	  but	  this	  new	  order	  proved	  to	  be	  
rather	  fragile	  and	  short-­‐lived.	  
	   Conservatives	  across	  Latin	  America	  instituted	  a	  quick	  and	  violent	  backlash	  to	  the	  
revolutionary	  movements	  that	  threatened	  their	  economic	  and	  political	  dominance.	  	  The	  
most	  violent	  and	  notorious	  example	  of	  such	  a	  response	  took	  place	  in	  Colombia,	  where	  
the	  rise	  of	  Jorge	  Eliécer	  Gaitán,	  “a	  dark-­‐skinned	  populist	  who	  rallied	  lower-­‐	  and	  middle-­‐
class	  support,”22	  led	  to	  a	  systematic	  purging	  of	  Liberals	  across	  the	  country	  and	  the	  
eventual	  assassination	  of	  Gaitán.	  	  Once	  World	  War	  II	  had	  ended,	  and	  the	  Cold	  War	  had	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  Brands.	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  America's	  Cold	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  Press,	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  Ibid.,	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begun,	  the	  United	  States	  became	  far	  less	  sympathetic	  to	  the	  left-­‐leaning	  political	  parties	  
of	  Latin	  America.	  	  Many	  military	  governments	  had	  come	  to	  power,	  and	  the	  U.S.	  certainly	  
did	  nothing	  to	  stop	  their	  rise	  (though	  the	  U.S.	  also	  did	  not	  overtly	  interfere	  with	  these	  
revolutions;	  there	  was	  no	  need).	  	  The	  militaries	  across	  Latin	  America	  were	  reacting	  to	  
the	  desires	  of	  the	  conservatives	  within	  their	  own	  countries	  rather	  than	  outside	  
pressures.	  	  The	  United	  States	  could	  avoid	  associating	  itself	  with	  severe	  human	  rights	  
abuses,	  yet	  could	  still	  achieve	  its	  goals	  of	  stamping	  out	  Communism	  and	  consolidating	  
hemispheric	  military	  cooperation.	  	  As	  Hal	  Brand	  put	  it,	  “to	  the	  extent	  that	  U.S.	  foreign	  
policy	  figured	  in	  the	  conservative	  restoration,	  it	  was	  a	  matter	  of	  neglect	  and	  
indifference,	  rather	  than	  pro-­‐authoritarian	  intervention.”23	  	  This	  was	  not	  the	  first	  or	  last	  
period	  that	  the	  United	  States	  would	  benefit	  from	  the	  installation	  of	  authoritarian	  
military	  regimes	  in	  Latin	  America.	  
	   The	  administration	  of	  Dwight	  D.	  Eisenhower	  (1953-­‐1960)	  oversaw	  some	  
important	  events	  and	  changes	  in	  regards	  to	  U.S.	  relations	  with	  Latin	  America	  and	  the	  
Cold	  War	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  Though	  Eisenhower’s	  election	  signified	  the	  end	  of	  a	  long	  run	  of	  
Democratic	  control	  of	  the	  White	  House,	  the	  Truman	  Doctrine	  remained	  in	  full	  effect.	  	  
The	  major	  change	  in	  foreign	  policy	  that	  began	  at	  this	  time	  was	  the	  growing	  impact	  and	  
influence	  of	  the	  CIA.	  	  Overt	  hard	  power	  was	  no	  longer	  the	  modus	  operandi	  of	  the	  United	  
States	  (except	  for	  in	  rare	  occasions).	  	  The	  era	  of	  numerous	  marine	  invasions	  across	  Latin	  
America	  was	  over.	  	  Instead,	  covert	  CIA	  actions	  dominated	  American	  intervention	  with	  its	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neighbors.24	  	  One	  major	  example	  of	  the	  CIA’s	  direct	  involvement	  in	  Latin	  American	  
affairs	  took	  place	  in	  Guatemala	  in	  1954.	  	  Colonel	  Jacobo	  Arbenz	  was	  elected	  President	  of	  
Guatemala	  in	  1950.	  	  Arbenz	  quickly	  instituted	  land	  reforms	  and	  expanded	  peasant	  rights	  
which	  upset	  the	  conservative	  land-­‐holding	  class	  as	  well	  as	  foreign-­‐owned	  banana	  
companies	  such	  as	  the	  United	  Fruit	  Company.25	  	  As	  follows	  the	  pattern	  we	  have	  seen	  in	  
previous	  examples	  of	  leftist	  reformers	  in	  Latin	  America,	  conservatives	  and	  the	  military	  
did	  everything	  in	  their	  power	  to	  maintain	  the	  status	  quo	  of	  their	  country.	  	  The	  U.S.,	  
seeing	  indications	  that	  Arbenz	  was	  leaning	  towards	  the	  Soviets	  (such	  as	  a	  purchase	  of	  
arms	  from	  Czechoslovakia),26	  capitalized	  on	  the	  already	  present	  unrest	  in	  Guatemala.	  	  In	  
1954,	  the	  CIA	  helped	  coordinate	  an	  invasion	  of	  Guatemala	  by	  a	  mercenary	  troop	  trained	  
in	  Honduras.	  	  The	  coup	  d’état	  succeeded	  in	  ousting	  Arbenz	  and	  installed	  a	  conservative,	  
pro-­‐U.S.	  regime	  (which	  engaged	  in	  major	  repression	  and	  human	  rights	  abuses).27	  
	   Clearly	  by	  this	  point	  the	  United	  States	  had	  a	  concrete	  reason	  and	  excuse	  to	  exert	  
its	  will	  on	  Latin	  America:	  stopping	  the	  spread	  of	  Communism.	  	  In	  the	  past,	  the	  Monroe	  
Doctrine	  provided	  a	  semblance	  of	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  America	  to	  “protect”	  the	  
nations	  of	  its	  hemisphere,	  but	  the	  onset	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  delivered	  more	  solid	  
justification	  for	  U.S.	  meddling.	  	  Oftentimes,	  the	  real	  reason	  for	  U.S.	  intervention	  was	  
based	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  economics	  and	  commerce,	  such	  as	  protecting	  the	  operations	  of	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the	  United	  Fruit	  Company	  or	  the	  Panama	  Canal.	  	  There	  has	  consistently	  been	  a	  blurry,	  or	  
indistinguishable,	  line	  between	  intervention	  on	  political	  grounds	  versus	  intervention	  to	  
protect	  or	  promote	  economic	  interests.	  	  However,	  the	  Cuban	  Revolution	  and	  the	  rising	  
to	  power	  of	  the	  revolutionary	  government	  led	  by	  Fidel	  Castro	  in	  1959	  posed	  a	  major	  
political	  conundrum	  for	  the	  United	  States.	  
	   The	  Cuban	  Revolution	  and	  its	  results	  represented	  the	  height	  of	  Cold	  War	  
tensions	  in	  Latin	  America.	  	  As	  Hal	  Brands	  described	  the	  situation:	  
The	  Cuban	  revolution	  exacerbated	  anti-­‐Americanism	  and	  tercermundismo	  
(“Third-­‐Worldism”)	  within	  Latin	  America,	  led	  to	  a	  precipitous	  escalation	  of	  
superpower	  competition	  in	  the	  region,	  and	  magnified	  the	  militancy	  of	  both	  Left	  
and	  Right.	  Perhaps	  most	  important,	  it	  gave	  these	  crises	  a	  single	  nexus,	  fusing	  
them	  together	  in	  the	  policies	  and	  ideological	  influence	  of	  revolutionary	  Cuba.	  
Over	  the	  next	  three	  decades,	  the	  interaction	  between	  these	  issues	  ensured	  the	  
relentless	  intensity	  of	  Latin	  America’s	  Cold	  War...	  	  Internal	  instability	  fostered	  
external	  meddling:	  Cuba,	  the	  United	  States,	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  competed	  
fiercely	  to	  manage	  or	  exploit	  this	  turmoil	  and	  guide	  the	  evolution	  of	  Latin	  
American	  society.	  Havana	  and	  Moscow	  forged	  a	  military	  alliance	  and	  aided	  the	  
region’s	  various	  guerilla	  groups,	  while	  Washington	  unveiled	  a	  vast	  economic	  
program	  -­‐	  the	  Alliance	  for	  Progress	  -­‐	  and	  deployed	  counterinsurgency,	  covert	  
action,	  and	  direct	  military	  intervention	  to	  thwart	  the	  radical	  Left.28	  
The	  government	  of	  Fulgencio	  Batista	  –	  which	  took	  power	  through	  a	  military	  coup	  –	  was	  
one	  of	  many	  brutal	  Latin	  American	  dictatorships	  that	  had	  friendly	  ties	  with	  Washington.	  	  
Batista	  provided	  tax	  and	  duty	  exemptions	  to	  American	  investors	  and	  actively	  persecuted	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Communists	  within	  his	  country	  (in	  collaboration	  with	  the	  CIA	  and	  FBI.)	  	  After	  an	  
undisputed	  election	  in	  1952,	  Batista	  ruled	  for	  seven	  years.	  	  His	  administration	  was	  
described	  as,	  “a	  bloody	  and	  merciless	  dictatorship	  that	  relied	  on	  its	  secret	  police	  and	  on	  
repression.”29	  	  However,	  the	  Eisenhower	  administration	  had	  no	  problem	  maintaining	  its	  
mutually	  beneficial	  relationship	  with	  Batista	  in	  the	  face	  of	  his	  brutal	  rule.	  	  Fidel	  Castro,	  
in	  response	  to	  Batista’s	  repressive	  and	  corrupt	  rule	  and	  a	  worsening	  class	  divide	  in	  Cuba,	  
initiated	  an	  insurrection	  in	  1953.	  	  
	   The	  United	  States’	  response	  to	  Castro’s	  uprising	  was	  far	  from	  certain.	  	  Public	  
knowledge	  of	  Fidel	  Castro’s	  existence	  was	  extremely	  limited	  until	  a	  1957	  New	  York	  
Times	  article.30	  	  Eisenhower	  had	  provided	  Batista	  with	  significant	  military	  and	  economic	  
aid	  in	  exchange	  for	  political	  cooperation.	  	  As	  news	  of	  growing	  successes	  by	  the	  rebels	  
came	  in	  to	  Washington,	  aid	  to	  Batista	  was	  increased.	  	  However,	  as	  it	  became	  clear	  that	  
Batista’s	  regime	  was	  losing	  ground,	  and	  Eisenhower	  sought	  to	  distance	  himself	  from	  an	  
administration	  increasingly	  known	  for	  killing	  its	  own	  people,	  the	  U.S.	  reversed	  its	  
policies.31	  	  In	  1958	  the	  United	  States	  imposed	  an	  arms	  embargo	  on	  Cuba,	  though	  the	  
United	  States	  Consul	  in	  Cuba	  advised	  against	  this	  citing	  a	  “possible	  Communist	  
influence”	  among	  the	  rebels.32	  	  Fidel	  Castro’s	  forces	  seized	  government	  buildings,	  and	  
Batista	  fled	  the	  country	  on	  January	  1,	  1959.	  	  Many	  of	  Cuba’s	  richest	  residents,	  as	  well	  as	  
Batista’s	  family	  members,	  also	  fled.	  	  Most	  were	  given	  asylum	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  	  It	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was	  reported	  that	  Batista	  and	  his	  family	  took	  between	  $300	  and	  $400	  million	  in	  cash	  
with	  them	  from	  Cuba,	  and	  millions	  more	  fled	  as	  capitalists	  fearing	  the	  rise	  of	  
communism	  sought	  to	  save	  their	  wealth.33	  	  On	  January	  7	  of	  the	  same	  year,	  the	  United	  
States	  officially	  recognized	  the	  new	  government	  in	  public,	  though	  CIA	  operations	  to	  
overthrow	  Castro	  had	  already	  begun.34	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  the	  CIA	  had	  also	  
been	  involved	  in	  counterrevolutionary	  efforts	  prior	  to	  Castro’s	  takeover.	  
At	  the	  time	  Castro	  took	  power,	  there	  were	  only	  suspicions	  of	  a	  communist	  
influence	  within	  the	  Cuban	  revolution.	  	  Some	  ambassadors	  and	  other	  American	  
intelligence	  officials	  had	  expressed	  their	  concerns	  to	  Eisenhower,	  but	  the	  initial	  U.S.	  
support	  of	  Batista	  against	  the	  rebellion	  was	  more	  due	  to	  his	  status	  as	  a	  compliant	  
dictator	  than	  fears	  of	  a	  communist	  insurgency.	  	  Though	  Castro	  advocated	  “agrarian	  
reform	  and	  economic	  redistribution,”	  the	  uprising,	  which	  began	  as	  a	  middle-­‐class	  revolt,	  
drew	  from	  many	  classes	  of	  Cuban	  society	  due	  to	  numerous	  grievances	  with	  the	  Batista	  
dictatorship.35	  	  Castro	  did	  expound	  anti-­‐imperialist	  and	  American	  sentiments,	  but	  he	  
repeatedly	  asserted,	  mostly	  in	  his	  speeches	  delivered	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  that	  he	  was	  
not	  a	  communist.	  	  Castro	  stated	  that	  he	  did	  not	  have	  “any	  intention	  of	  letting	  the	  
“comrades”	  play	  a	  part	  in	  the	  government.	  	  He	  promised	  that	  agrarian	  reform…	  would	  
not	  expropriate	  or	  nationalize	  American	  property.”36	  	  Maurice	  Halperin	  described	  Castro	  
in	  this	  early	  stage	  as	  a	  nationalist	  and	  radical,	  but	  a	  man	  otherwise	  unsure	  about	  his	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33	  Guillermo	  Villaronda.	  Bohemia.	  (Havana,	  February	  15,	  1959),	  1321.	  
34	  Jane	  Franklin.	  Cuba	  and	  the	  United	  States.	  	  18.	  
35	  Hal	  Brands.	  Latin	  America's	  Cold	  War.	  24.	  
36	  Clara	  Nieto	  and	  Chris	  Brandt.	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  of	  War.	  	  46.	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ideas.	  	  He	  was	  influenced	  by	  earlier	  Cuban	  rebels	  like	  Martí	  and	  Guiteras,	  and,	  Halperin	  
noted:	  	  
In	  no	  sense	  was	  he	  a	  Marxist	  or	  Leninist	  about	  whose	  doctrines	  he	  knew	  next	  do	  
nothing.	  	  His	  philosophical	  views	  about	  social	  justice	  could	  more	  easily	  have	  
come	  from	  Cervantes	  and	  Victor	  Hugo	  than	  from	  Lenin	  or	  Stalin.37	  
However,	  many	  skeptics	  worldwide	  considered	  these	  statements	  by	  Castro	  to	  be	  a	  tactic	  
designed	  to	  alleviate	  American	  fears	  in	  order	  to	  buy	  time	  for	  him	  to	  achieve	  his	  
objectives.38	  
Soon	  after	  taking	  power,	  Castro	  began	  a	  tour	  of	  the	  Americas.	  	  He	  visited	  the	  
United	  States,	  Canada,	  Brazil,	  Uruguay,	  and	  Argentina	  (where	  he	  participated	  in	  a	  
meeting	  of	  the	  Committee	  of	  21,	  an	  OAS	  offshoot	  consisting	  of	  delegates	  from	  the	  U.S.	  
and	  20	  other	  nations	  of	  the	  western	  hemisphere).	  	  Everywhere	  he	  went,	  “he	  received	  a	  
hero’s	  welcome,”	  though	  many	  governments	  of	  the	  hemisphere	  did	  not	  share	  the	  
enthusiasm	  of	  their	  people,	  perhaps	  fearing	  a	  similar	  revolution	  within	  their	  borders.39	  	  
Castro	  publicly	  lamented	  the	  inequalities	  plaguing	  Latin	  America	  and	  proposed	  the	  
creation	  of	  a	  “Latin	  American	  common	  market”	  in	  coordination	  with	  a	  regional	  
economic	  development	  plan	  funded	  by	  the	  United	  States.	  	  Eisenhower	  rejected	  these	  
propositions,	  calling	  them	  “ridiculous”	  and	  “demagogic.”	  	  Javier	  Pazos,	  a	  Cuban	  
economist	  who	  travelled	  with	  Castro	  to	  the	  summit	  in	  Argentina,	  believed	  that	  Castro’s	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37	  Maurice	  Halperin.	  The	  Rise	  And	  Decline	  Of	  Fidel	  Castro;	  An	  Essay	  In	  Contemporary	  History.	  (Berkeley:	  
University	  of	  California	  Press,	  1972),	  50.	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  Ibid.,	  49.	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  Nieto	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  Chris	  Brandt.	  Masters	  of	  War.	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proposals	  of	  economic	  collaboration	  with	  the	  United	  States	  represented	  a	  desire	  to	  
maintain	  a	  close	  alliance	  with	  the	  United	  States.40	  	  Eisenhower’s	  rejection	  threw	  away	  
what	  Herbert	  Matthews	  of	  the	  New	  York	  Times	  described	  as,	  “the	  last	  chance	  for	  the	  
United	  States…	  to	  keep	  Castro	  within	  a	  more	  or	  less	  democratic,	  certainly	  non-­‐
Communist,	  hemispheric	  framework.”41	  
U.S.	  tensions	  with	  Cuba	  heightened	  on	  April	  21,	  1959	  when	  a	  group	  of	  people	  
left	  Cuba	  for	  Panama	  with	  the	  intent	  to	  overthrow	  the	  Panamanian	  government.	  	  
Though	  Castro	  denied	  involvement	  with	  the	  plot,	  this	  action	  was	  hemispherically	  seen	  
as	  Cuba	  exporting	  its	  revolution	  and	  created	  alarm.	  	  In	  the	  following	  months,	  groups	  of	  
Nicaraguans,	  Dominicans,	  and	  Haitians	  left	  Cuba	  with	  the	  intention	  of	  inspiring	  uprisings	  
against	  the	  dictators	  of	  their	  respective	  countries:	  Somoza,	  Trujillo,	  and	  Duvalier.	  	  
Though	  these	  attempts	  failed,	  and	  the	  Cuban	  government	  continued	  to	  deny	  
responsibility,	  they	  provided	  Washington	  with	  further	  evidence	  of	  Cuba’s	  attempts	  to	  
export	  its	  revolution,	  threatening	  the	  stability	  of	  U.S.	  –	  friendly	  regimes	  throughout	  the	  
region.	  42	  	  Cuba	  also	  became	  a	  haven	  for	  “rebels,	  political	  refugees,	  and	  exiles	  from	  the	  
dictatorships	  supported	  by	  Washington	  throughout	  the	  continent.	  	  It	  became	  a	  veritable	  
Mecca	  for	  revolutionaries,	  to	  whom	  it	  gave	  refuge	  and	  military	  training.”43	  	  It	  is	  clear	  to	  
see,	  regardless	  of	  the	  perceived	  threat	  of	  a	  Communist	  takeover	  of	  Cuba,	  why	  the	  
current	  state	  of	  affairs	  was	  alarming	  to	  Eisenhower’s	  administration.	  	  Hemispheric	  unity	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40	  Clara	  Nieto	  and	  Chris	  Brandt.	  Masters	  of	  War.	  	  48.	  
41	  Herbert	  Matthews.	  Fidel	  Castro.	  (New	  York:	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  Clara	  Nieto	  and	  Chris	  Brandt.	  Masters	  of	  War.	  	  48-­‐49.	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  Ibid.,	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was	  becoming	  fractured	  as	  Latin	  Americans	  across	  the	  continents	  demonstrated	  their	  
support	  for	  Castro,	  and	  the	  U.S.-­‐friendly	  dictatorships	  found	  themselves	  in	  a	  precarious	  
position.	  
The	  year	  1959,	  the	  “Year	  of	  Liberation”	  according	  to	  the	  revolutionary	  
government	  of	  Cuba,	  held	  a	  series	  of	  events	  that	  threw	  U.S.–Cuba	  relations	  into	  a	  
precipitous	  decline.	  	  After	  announcing	  Cuba’s	  intention	  to	  obtain	  not	  only	  political,	  but	  
economic	  freedom,	  Fidel	  Castro	  began	  an	  assault	  on	  American	  interests	  in	  Cuba.	  	  
According	  to	  Clara	  Nieto	  and	  Chris	  Brandt,	  until	  1958,	  “80	  percent	  of	  Cuba’s	  
international	  transactions	  were	  with	  the	  United	  States,	  [and]	  the	  United	  States	  was	  the	  
largest	  market	  for	  Cuban	  sugar,	  the	  island’s	  most	  important	  product.”44,	  45	  	  However,	  in	  
May	  of	  1959,	  under	  the	  Agrarian	  Reform	  Law,	  $500	  million	  of	  United	  States	  investments	  
in	  Cuba	  were	  expropriated.	  	  Eisenhower	  quickly	  condemned	  this	  aggressive	  move	  by	  
Castro	  and	  soon	  enacted	  “Operation	  Pluto”,	  a	  concerted	  CIA	  effort	  to	  overthrow	  Fidel	  
Castro	  and	  weaken	  his	  regime	  in	  any	  way	  possible.	  	  Additionally,	  the	  U.S.	  offered	  
financial	  incentives	  for	  skilled	  Cubans	  to	  emigrate,	  initiating	  a	  significant	  brain-­‐	  and	  
capital	  drain.	  	  The	  United	  States’	  increasingly	  aggressive	  actions	  towards	  Cuba	  in	  turn	  
pushed	  Castro	  closer	  to	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  
In	  early	  1960,	  the	  Vice	  Prime	  Minster	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  Anastas	  Mikoyan,	  
visited	  Havana	  for	  the	  opening	  of	  a	  Soviet	  exposition.	  	  The	  two	  countries	  also	  signed	  a	  
large,	  5-­‐year	  commercial	  agreement	  including	  a	  $100	  million	  credit	  granted	  to	  Cuba.	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  Clara	  Nieto	  and	  Chris	  Brandt.	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  Hugh	  Thomas.	  Cuba:	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Diplomatic	  relations,	  which	  were	  severed	  during	  the	  Batista	  regime,	  officially	  resumed.	  	  
The	  following	  April	  300,000	  tons	  of	  Soviet	  oil	  arrived	  in	  Cuba,	  which	  the	  American-­‐
owned	  refineries	  refused	  to	  refine.	  	  In	  June,	  Castro’s	  government	  nationalized	  the	  
refineries,	  and	  in	  August	  the	  United	  States	  officially	  began	  an	  economic	  and	  commercial	  
embargo	  against	  Cuba.	  	  In	  response	  to	  this	  aggressive	  action	  by	  the	  U.S.,	  Castro	  
nationalized	  the	  remaining	  American-­‐owned	  sugar	  plantations,	  as	  well	  as	  industrial	  
enterprises,	  telephone	  and	  electric	  companies,	  financial	  enterprises,	  hotels,	  movie	  
theaters,	  and	  much	  more.	  	  The	  total	  value	  of	  all	  expropriations	  of	  American	  enterprises	  
exceeded	  $1	  billion.46,47	  	  Though	  this	  sweeping	  socialization	  of	  the	  Cuban	  economy	  did	  
not	  yet	  signify	  an	  official	  alliance	  with	  Moscow,	  the	  break	  away	  from	  possible	  
reconciliation	  with	  the	  United	  States	  was	  now	  irreversible.	  
In	  1961,	  Fidel	  Castro	  made	  an	  official	  declaration	  of	  socialist	  objectives.48	  	  Soon	  
after,	  President	  Eisenhower	  approved	  an	  overt	  attack	  against	  Cuba,	  which	  would	  take	  
place	  under	  the	  administration	  of	  President	  John	  F.	  Kennedy.	  	  What	  became	  known	  as	  
the	  Bay	  of	  Pigs	  invasion	  consisted	  of	  a	  force	  of	  around	  1,200	  Cuban	  exiles	  –	  armed	  and	  
supplied	  by	  the	  CIA	  –	  that	  landed	  on	  Cuban	  soil	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  gather	  support	  from	  
domestic	  anti-­‐Castro	  activists	  and	  initiate	  a	  coup	  d’état.	  	  This	  last-­‐ditch	  attempt	  to	  repel	  
communist	  inroads	  into	  Cuba	  and	  reestablish	  full	  American	  hegemony	  on	  the	  continent	  
came	  at	  a	  time	  that,	  according	  to	  Hal	  Brands,	  “occurred	  at	  the	  intersection	  of	  Latin	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America’s	  domestic	  upheaval	  and	  international	  crises.”49	  	  The	  invasion	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  
a	  disaster,	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  operation	  and	  the	  international	  response.	  	  President	  
Kennedy,	  who	  had	  been	  reluctant	  to	  follow	  through	  with	  Eisenhower’s	  plan	  to	  begin	  
with,	  abandoned	  the	  mission	  and	  the	  Cuban	  invaders	  once	  it	  was	  clear	  that	  it	  would	  fail.	  
	  	  What	  had	  been	  intended	  to	  undermine	  internal	  order	  in	  Cuba	  only	  succeeded	  in	  
doing	  so	  elsewhere	  in	  Latin	  America,	  as	  news	  of	  the	  Bay	  of	  Pigs	  disaster	  sparked	  anti-­‐
U.S.	  demonstrations	  in	  Mexico	  and	  Chile.50	  	  Additionally,	  the	  U.S.-­‐sponsored	  invasion	  
further	  solidified	  communist	  rule	  in	  Cuba.	  	  Castro	  officially	  declared	  himself	  a	  
communist,	  and	  Cuban	  officials	  are	  quoted	  as	  telling	  East	  German	  officials	  that	  Cuba	  had	  
moved	  from	  “the	  stage	  of	  the	  anti-­‐imperialist	  agrarian	  revolution”	  to	  “the	  stage	  of	  the	  
socialist	  revolution.”51	  	  Internal	  opposition	  to	  Cuba’s	  communist	  leanings	  disappeared	  
with	  rallying	  behind	  a	  common	  cause	  and	  against	  a	  common	  enemy.	  	  Che	  Guevara	  
publicly	  thanked	  the	  U.S.	  for	  the	  invasion,	  stating	  “that	  it	  had	  been	  a	  great	  political	  
victory	  for	  [the	  Communist	  Party].”52	  	  The	  Bay	  of	  Pigs	  invasion	  stirred	  up	  anti-­‐American	  
sentiment	  and	  tercermundismo	  around	  Latin	  America,	  and	  opened	  the	  door	  for	  Moscow	  
to	  become	  a	  major	  player	  in	  the	  Western	  hemisphere.	  	  This	  moment	  represented	  a	  
turning	  point	  in	  terms	  of	  U.S.	  foreign	  relations	  with	  Latin	  America.	  	  From	  the	  early	  60s	  
until	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  the	  Monroe	  doctrine	  era	  of	  a	  single	  major	  power	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49	  Hal	  Brands.	  Latin	  America's	  Cold	  War.	  	  34.	  
50	  Ibid.,	  	  34-­‐35.	  
51	  Ibid.,	  35.	  
52	  Dick	  Goodwin.	  “Conversation	  with	  Comandante	  Ernesto	  Guevara	  of	  Cuba.”	  National	  Security	  Archive.	  
August	  22,	  1961.	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influencing	  the	  West	  was	  over.	  	  The	  Cold	  War	  (which	  often	  verged	  on	  hot	  in	  this	  region)	  
had	  officially	  entered	  the	  Americas,	  and	  the	  U.S.	  response	  was	  often	  brutal
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Chapter	  2:	  The	  1960s	  and	  the	  United	  States’	  Loss	  of	  Hegemony	  
	  
“Maintain	  U.S.	  Hegemony	  at	  all	  Costs	  by	  Preventing	  Further	  Communist	  or	  
Hostile	  Regimes	  -­‐-­‐	  intervene	  if	  necessary	  to	  maintain	  "friendly	  stability";	  prevent	  or	  
overturn,	  if	  possible	  by	  economic	  or	  other	  non-­‐military	  means,	  communist	  or	  hostile	  
nationalist	  governments.”1	  –	  From	  a	  National	  Security	  Council	  study,	  1969	  
	  
	   When	  President	  Eisenhower	  left	  office	  in	  1961,	  the	  Cold	  War	  had	  arrived	  on	  
America’s	  borders,	  and	  Latin	  America	  was	  a	  hotbed	  of	  instability	  and	  revolutionary	  
tremors.	  	  People	  around	  the	  world	  resented	  America’s	  hypocrisy	  in	  claiming	  to	  defend	  
worldwide	  democracy,	  yet	  at	  the	  same	  time	  supporting	  repressive	  governments	  around	  
the	  world	  –	  especially	  in	  Latin	  America.	  	  As	  Clara	  Nieto	  and	  Chris	  Brandt	  described	  the	  
situation:	  	  
The	  policy	  of	  the	  United	  States	  regarding	  Latin	  America	  had	  been	  to	  support	  
dictatorships.	  	  The	  brutality	  and	  corruption	  bothered	  neither	  Eisenhower	  nor	  his	  
secretary	  of	  state,	  John	  Foster	  Dulles.	  	  What	  mattered	  to	  them	  was	  that	  these
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  NSC–IG/ARA.	  “A	  Study	  of	  U.S.	  Policy	  Toward	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  America	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  Security	  Study	  Memorandum	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  1969–1976.	  Volume	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  on	  American	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governments	  maintained	  public	  order,	  prosecuted	  Communists,	  and	  granted	  
carte	  blanche	  to	  United	  States	  transnational	  companies	  and	  investors.1	  
Eisenhower	  undertook	  a	  Latin	  American	  tour	  at	  the	  end	  of	  his	  final	  term	  and,	  according	  
to	  Townsed	  Hoopes,	  the	  biographer	  of	  secretary	  of	  state	  John	  Foster	  Dulles,	  was	  
greeted	  with	  riots,	  bombs,	  and	  passionate	  demonstrations	  in	  Argentina,	  Uruguay,	  and	  
Chile.2	  	  With	  university	  students	  at	  the	  forefront,	  Latin	  American	  populations	  were	  
rallying	  for	  social	  equality,	  an	  end	  to	  American	  intervention,	  and	  economic	  
redistribution.	  	  This	  trend	  scared	  America	  and	  its	  puppet	  dictators,	  and	  Moscow	  sought	  
to	  capitalize	  on	  the	  unrest.	  
	   Two	  major	  policy	  responses	  arose	  in	  the	  face	  of	  the	  increasing	  threat	  of	  
communism	  and	  anti-­‐Americanism:	  the	  Alliance	  for	  Progress	  program	  initiated	  by	  
President	  Kennedy	  and	  the	  National	  Security	  Doctrine	  on	  the	  part	  of	  Latin	  America’s	  
military	  heads.	  	  In	  1961,	  President	  Kennedy	  unveiled	  a	  “vast	  cooperative	  effort,	  
unparalleled	  in	  magnitude	  and	  nobility	  of	  purpose,	  to	  satisfy	  the	  basic	  needs	  of	  the	  
American	  people	  for	  homes,	  work	  and	  land,	  health	  and	  schools.”3	  	  The	  Alliance	  for	  
Progress	  was	  proposed	  as	  a	  ten-­‐year	  economic	  aid	  program,	  expanding	  significantly	  
upon	  Eisenhower’s	  previous	  plan.	  	  It	  was,	  however,	  also	  designed	  to	  alleviate	  tensions	  in	  
Latin	  America	  over	  growing	  social	  unrest	  from	  which	  the	  leftists	  benefited	  greatly.	  	  
According	  to	  Hal	  Brands,	  the	  program	  was	  part	  of	  the	  Kennedy	  administration’s	  goal	  of	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  Clara	  Nieto	  and	  Chris	  Brandt.	  Masters	  of	  War:	  Latin	  America	  And	  United	  States	  Aggression	  From	  The	  
Cuban	  Revolution	  Through	  The	  Clinton	  Years	  (New	  York:	  Seven	  Stories	  Press,	  2003),	  55.	  
2	  Townsend	  Hoopes,	  The	  Devil	  and	  John	  Foster	  Dulles	  (Boston:	  Little,	  Brown,	  1973),	  503-­‐504.	  
3	  Joseph	  Smith.	  The	  United	  States	  and	  Latin	  America:	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  History	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  American	  Diplomacy	  (New	  York:	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  2005)	  ,124.	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“liberal	  anticommunism,”	  addressing	  the	  gripes	  of	  the	  lower	  classes	  to	  avoid	  political	  
uprising.4	  	  National	  Security	  Doctrine,	  as	  defined	  by	  Hal	  Brands,	  “centered	  on	  the	  
premise	  that	  Latin	  American	  countries	  were	  now	  menaced	  by	  the	  twin	  dangers	  of	  
subversion	  and	  insurgency,”	  both	  from	  communists	  and	  the	  “the	  growth	  of	  student	  and	  
union	  activism	  in	  the	  cities	  and	  the	  surging	  influence	  of	  liberation	  theology	  in	  the	  
countryside.”5	  	  Military	  leaders,	  much	  to	  the	  delight	  of	  many	  American	  politicians,	  used	  
this	  doctrine	  as	  justification	  for	  numerous	  military	  coups	  during	  the	  1960s	  and	  70s.	  	  
Many	  left-­‐leaning	  (often	  democratically	  elected)	  governments	  were	  overthrown,	  and	  a	  
tide	  of	  military	  rule	  swept	  across	  Latin	  America.	  
Coups	  d’états	  were	  a	  common	  occurrence	  in	  the	  1960s,	  causing	  drastic	  swings	  
for	  or	  against	  U.S.	  interests.	  	  Many	  came	  in	  response	  to	  growing	  fears,	  in	  Washington	  
and	  among	  the	  dictators	  of	  Latin	  America,	  of	  leftist	  movements.	  	  In	  1962,	  Argentina’s	  
President	  Arturo	  Frondizi,	  the	  first	  civilian	  president	  in	  16	  years,	  was	  overthrown.	  	  This	  
signaled	  a	  continuation	  of	  Argentina’s	  struggle	  with	  Peronism	  and	  an	  overall	  loss	  of	  an	  
American	  ally.6,7,8	  	  The	  following	  year,	  Miguel	  Ydígoras	  Fuentes,	  an	  authoritarian	  ruler	  
with	  ties	  to	  the	  United	  States,	  was	  overthrown	  in	  Guatemala.	  	  Despite	  President	  
Kennedy’s	  declared	  mission	  of	  preventing	  coups	  and	  dictatorships,	  in	  the	  following	  year	  
the	  leaders	  of	  Ecuador,	  Peru,	  the	  Dominican	  Republic,	  and	  Honduras	  fell.	  	  Kennedy	  drew	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  Hal	  Brands.	  Latin	  America's	  Cold	  War	  (Cambridge:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  2010),	  44-­‐45.	  
5	  Ibid.,	  71.	  
6	  Torcuato	  S.	  Di	  Tella.	  History	  Of	  Political	  Parties	  In	  Twentieth-­‐Century	  Latin	  America	  (New	  Brunswick:	  
Transaction	  Publishers,	  2004),	  108.	  
7	  Hal	  Brands.	  Latin	  America's	  Cold	  War.	  45.	  
8	  Clara	  Nieto	  and	  Chris	  Brandt.	  Masters	  of	  War.	  156-­‐157.	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criticism	  for	  officially	  recognizing	  the	  newly	  installed	  dictators.9	  	  In	  1964,	  a	  major	  coup	  
shook	  Brazil.	  	  President	  João	  Goulart,	  who	  surrounded	  himself	  with	  leftists	  including	  the	  
Soviet-­‐oriented	  Communist	  Party,	  Maoists,	  and	  those	  loyal	  to	  Fidel	  Castro,	  was	  
overthrown	  by	  the	  military.10	  	  The	  coup	  was	  heavily	  supported	  by	  the	  civilian	  middle	  and	  
upper	  classes,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  CIA,	  the	  U.S.	  military,	  and	  President	  Lyndon	  Johnson	  
himself.	  	  In	  a	  1964	  recording	  of	  a	  discussion	  between	  President	  Johnson	  and	  
Undersecretary	  of	  State	  George	  Ball	  and	  Assistant	  Secretary	  for	  Latin	  America	  Thomas	  
Mann,	  Johnson	  orders	  his	  officials	  to	  “be	  prepared	  to	  do	  everything	  that	  we	  need	  to	  do”	  
to	  oust	  Goulart.11	  	  Johnson	  also	  authorized	  major	  military	  support	  of	  the	  coup	  in	  Brazil.	  	  
In	  what	  was	  called	  Operation	  Brother	  Sam,	  an	  aircraft	  carrier,	  four	  destroyers,	  two	  
destroyer	  escorts,	  as	  well	  as	  fuel,	  110	  tons	  of	  ammunition	  “for	  mob	  control”	  and	  various	  
aircraft	  were	  made	  immediately	  available	  “in	  order	  be	  [sic]	  in	  a	  position	  to	  render	  
assistance	  at	  appropriate	  time	  to	  anti-­‐Goulart	  forces.”12	  	  The	  military	  regime	  that	  took	  
over,	  headed	  by	  dictator	  Humberto	  Castelo	  Branco,	  lasted	  for	  21	  years.	  	  Castelo	  Branco,	  
who	  routinely	  engaged	  in	  assassination	  or	  “disappearing”	  of	  his	  political	  rivals,	  benefited	  
greatly	  from	  IMF	  and	  World	  Bank	  loans	  and	  American	  investment	  because	  he	  was	  seen	  
as	  a	  stable	  ally	  against	  communism.13	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  Peter	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The	  Johnson	  administration	  continued	  to	  directly	  intervene	  in	  the	  affairs	  of	  Latin	  
American	  nations,	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  escalating	  the	  Vietnam	  War	  and	  dealing	  with	  
domestic	  turmoil	  surrounding	  the	  Civil	  Rights	  and	  anti-­‐war	  movements.	  	  In	  1965,	  
marines	  landed	  in	  the	  Dominican	  Republic	  in	  a	  move	  to	  quash	  a	  rebel	  uprising.	  	  This	  
invasion	  was	  the	  first	  armed,	  overt	  U.S.	  intervention	  in	  Latin	  America	  in	  over	  three	  
decades.14	  	  In	  response	  to	  this	  invasion	  and	  other	  actions,	  Johnson	  drew	  large	  
international	  criticism	  for	  violations	  of	  “the	  principle	  of	  nonintervention,	  of	  international	  
law,	  of	  the	  United	  Nations’	  and	  the	  OAS	  charters.”15	  	  There	  were	  fears,	  such	  as	  those	  
from	  Alberto	  Lleras,	  former	  president	  of	  Colombia,	  that	  Johnson’s	  aggressive	  actions	  
would	  turn	  the	  Cold	  War	  hot.16	  	  In	  the	  face	  of	  such	  pervasive	  criticism	  however,	  
domestic	  support	  for	  Johnson’s	  actions	  remained	  strong	  with	  initial	  polls	  showing	  
overwhelming	  support	  for	  the	  invasion	  of	  the	  Dominican	  Republic.17	  	  Further,	  on	  
September	  20	  1965,	  “by	  a	  vote	  of	  312	  to	  54,	  the	  House	  of	  Representatives	  approved	  a	  
resolution	  authorizing	  the	  government	  to	  intervene	  in	  the	  affairs	  of	  other	  nations,	  
including	  armed	  intervention,	  where	  there	  was	  a	  risk	  of	  Communist	  subversion.”18,19	  	  
Unfortunately	  for	  Johnson,	  his	  domestic	  constituency	  did	  not	  have	  the	  same	  level	  of	  
support	  in	  regards	  to	  the	  Vietnam	  War.	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  House	  resolution	  560	  signified	  the	  inception	  of	  the	  Johnson	  Doctrine,	  with	  
which	  the	  president	  proclaimed	  “the	  United	  States	  would	  never	  again	  permit	  the	  
establishment	  of	  a	  Communist	  regime	  in	  the	  Western	  Hemisphere.”20	  	  This	  declaration	  
resembled	  in	  philosophy	  the	  Monroe	  Doctrine	  of	  years	  past,	  substituting	  the	  threat	  of	  
British	  intervention	  with	  communism.	  	  This	  proclamation	  and	  the	  invasion	  of	  the	  
Dominican	  Republic	  clearly	  violated	  Article	  15	  of	  the	  charter	  of	  the	  OAS	  (1948),	  which	  
prohibited	  any	  member	  state	  from	  intervening	  “directly,	  or	  indirectly,	  for	  any	  reason	  
whatever,	  in	  the	  internal	  of	  external	  affairs	  of	  any	  other	  state.”21	  	  Additionally,	  the	  
Johnson	  Doctrine	  contradicted	  President	  Franklin	  Roosevelt’s	  nonintervention	  pledge,	  
the	  fundamental	  feature	  of	  the	  Good	  Neighbor	  policy,	  and	  President	  Kennedy’s	  vision	  of	  
hemispheric	  partnership	  included	  in	  the	  Alliance	  for	  Progress	  program.22	  	  However,	  as	  
demonstrated	  already	  in	  this	  paper,	  these	  violations	  and	  contradictions	  are	  simply	  
technicalities,	  as	  the	  United	  States	  has	  routinely	  engaged	  in	  hemispheric	  intervention	  
since	  the	  19th	  century.	  	  The	  official	  recognition	  of	  the	  Johnson	  Doctrine	  represents	  the	  
way	  U.S.	  policy	  towards	  Latin	  America	  was	  distinctly	  viewed	  and	  executed	  through	  the	  
prism	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  from	  1945	  until	  1989.	  
President	  Lyndon	  Johnson,	  once	  a	  very	  popular	  figure,	  ended	  his	  presidency	  with	  
destroyed	  image	  and	  credibility.	  	  His	  inability	  to	  end	  –	  or	  even	  improve	  the	  situation	  of	  –	  
the	  Vietnam	  War	  cost	  him	  dearly,	  and	  he	  decided	  not	  to	  seek	  reelection	  in	  1968.	  	  While	  
the	  most	  important	  issue	  to	  Americans	  was	  certainly	  Vietnam,	  as	  Johnson’s	  escapades	  in	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Latin	  America	  did	  not	  produce	  the	  newsworthy	  images	  of	  coffins	  draped	  with	  the	  
American	  flag,	  his	  over-­‐aggressive	  foreign	  policy	  had	  put	  the	  U.S.	  in	  weak	  standing	  
abroad.	  	  American	  alliances	  in	  Latin	  America	  were	  built	  on	  the	  teetering	  supports	  of	  
military	  dictatorships.	  	  President	  Richard	  Nixon,	  who	  took	  office	  in	  1969,	  inherited	  a	  
precarious	  international	  field.	  
	  28	  
	  
Chapter	  3:	  A	  Brief	  History	  of	  U.S.	  Relations	  with	  Chile,	  and	  Allende’s	  Rise	  
to	  Power.	  
	  
“It	  was	  not	  in	  our	  interest	  to	  have	  the	  military	  take	  over	  in	  Chile.	  	  It	  would	  have	  been	  
better	  had	  Allende	  served	  his	  entire	  term	  taking	  the	  nation	  and	  the	  Chilean	  people	  into	  
complete	  and	  total	  ruin.	  	  Only	  then	  would	  the	  full	  discrediting	  of	  socialism	  have	  taken	  
place.	  	  Only	  then	  would	  people	  have	  gotten	  the	  message	  that	  socialism	  doesn’t	  
work.	  	  What	  has	  happened	  has	  confused	  this	  lesson.”1	  –	  Jack	  Kubisch,	  Assistant	  
Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Inter-­‐American	  Affairs.	  
	  
President	  Richard	  Nixon,	  and	  his	  foreign	  relations	  mastermind	  Henry	  Kissinger,	  
are	  often	  credited	  for	  their	  foreign	  policy	  successes,	  despite	  the	  otherwise	  scandal-­‐
marred	  administration.	  	  Nixon	  succeeded	  in	  pulling	  America	  out	  of	  the	  Vietnam	  War,	  
opening	  up	  relations	  with	  China,	  and	  engaging	  in	  fruitful	  talks	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union.2	  	  
However,	  this	  paper	  will	  focus	  on	  the	  United	  States’	  relations	  with	  Chile,	  a	  long	  and	  
complicated	  affair,	  through	  Nixon’s	  administration	  as	  a	  primary	  case	  study.	  	  The	  political	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Tad	  Szulc.	  “The	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situation	  leading	  up	  to	  Salvador	  Allende’s	  rise	  to	  power	  in	  Chile	  was	  quite	  complex.	  	  In	  
the	  words	  of	  Hal	  Brands:	  	  
Between	  the	  late	  1960s	  and	  the	  mid-­‐1970s	  the	  lower	  half	  of	  South	  America	  was	  
the	  locus	  of	  a	  jarring	  collision	  between	  a	  revitalized	  leftist	  radicalism	  that	  found	  
expression	  in	  urban	  guerilla	  warfare	  and	  an	  intense,	  often	  brutal	  anticommunism	  
embodied	  by	  National	  Security	  Doctrine.1	  
The	  U.S.	  continued	  its	  policy	  of	  stamping	  out	  Communism	  at	  all	  costs,	  usually	  in	  the	  
form	  of	  supporting	  military	  dictatorships.	  	  Yet	  there	  were	  economic	  and	  political	  
concerns,	  which	  hinted	  at	  a	  fall	  of	  U.S.	  hegemony	  in	  the	  Western	  Hemisphere.	  	  As	  Hal	  
Brands	  said:	  
During	  the	  late	  1960s	  and	  the	  early	  1970s	  the	  post-­‐World	  War	  II	  structure	  of	  
international	  relations	  was	  groaning	  under	  the	  weight	  of	  three	  decades’	  
accumulated	  strain.	  Washington’s	  failure	  in	  Vietnam,	  the	  emergence	  of	  I	  and	  the	  
breakdown	  of	  Bretton	  Woods,	  and	  the	  oil	  shocks	  of	  1973-­‐1974	  posed	  major	  
challenges	  for	  the	  United	  States	  and	  the	  West	  in	  general,	  and	  even	  raised	  the	  
question	  of	  whether	  the	  era	  of	  U.S.	  and	  Western	  preeminence	  had	  come	  to	  an	  
end.	  As	  the	  system	  creaked,	  Latin	  American	  diplomats	  sensed	  opportunity.2	  
Latin	  American	  political	  systems	  had	  fallen	  into	  a	  situation	  of	  extremes.	  	  Radical	  leftists	  
and	  military	  dictators	  clashed	  constantly,	  contributing	  to	  the	  ever-­‐persistent	  cycle	  of	  
coup	  d’états	  and	  political	  violence.	  	  In	  the	  eyes	  of	  American	  policy-­‐makers,	  many	  of	  
these	  conflicts	  were	  localized	  and	  not	  deemed	  a	  threat	  to	  national	  interests.	  	  However,	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the	  rise	  of	  Salvador	  Allende,	  a	  democratically	  elected	  President	  with	  socialist	  intentions	  
and	  ties	  to	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  raised	  fears	  in	  Washington.	  
	   Since	  the	  time	  that	  the	  United	  States	  has	  substantially	  engaged	  with	  its	  
neighbors,	  Chile	  has	  been	  of	  major	  importance,	  both	  as	  a	  political	  and	  economic	  ally.	  	  
The	  official	  start	  of	  U.S.	  –	  Chile	  relations	  began	  in	  1811	  when	  Joel	  Roberts	  Poinsett,	  sent	  
by	  President	  James	  Madison	  to	  investigate	  the	  prospects	  of	  Chile	  and	  Argentina’s	  
struggles	  for	  independence,	  arrived	  in	  Chile.	  	  Poinsett,	  who	  attempted	  to	  aid	  Chile	  in	  
their	  fight	  against	  the	  royalists	  and	  help	  establish	  trade	  relations	  with	  the	  U.S.,	  was	  the	  
first	  official	  agent	  from	  a	  foreign	  government	  to	  arrive	  in	  Chile.3	  	  During	  the	  19th	  century,	  
the	  United	  States	  continued	  to	  attempt	  to	  influence	  Chilean	  politics,	  jockeying	  with	  
other	  regional	  and	  European	  powers	  and	  backing	  favorable	  politicians,	  during	  key	  time	  
periods	  such	  as	  the	  War	  of	  the	  Pacific	  and	  the	  Chilean	  Civil	  War.	  	  After	  World	  War	  I,	  the	  
United	  States	  overtook	  Great	  Britain	  as	  the	  primary	  foreign	  economic	  force	  in	  Chile.	  	  
Two	  large	  American	  mining	  companies,	  Anaconda	  Copper	  and	  Kennecott	  Utah	  Copper,	  
began	  large	  operations	  in	  Chile,	  which	  has	  huge	  copper	  reserves.	  	  In	  1922,	  Anaconda	  
acquired	  the	  largest	  copper	  mine	  in	  the	  world,	  Chuquicamata.	  	  American	  copper	  mining	  
interests,	  until	  the	  1970s,	  held	  major	  economic	  and	  political	  power	  within	  Chile.	  	  
According	  to	  Theodore	  H.	  Moran,	  until	  the	  1970s,	  mining	  industries	  “controlled	  
between	  7%	  and	  20%	  of	  [Chile’s]	  Gross	  Domestic	  Product.”4	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Charles	  Janeway	  Stillé.	  The	  Life	  and	  Services	  of	  Joel	  R.	  Poinsett	  (Kessinger	  Publishing,	  LLC,	  2010),	  28-­‐31.	  
4	  Theodore	  H.	  Moran.	  Multinational	  Corporations	  and	  the	  Politics	  of	  Dependence:	  Copper	  in	  Chile	  
(Princeton,	  New	  Jersey:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1974),	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Through	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  20th	  century,	  the	  United	  States	  had	  a	  firm	  grip	  on	  
Chile’s	  economy.	  	  However,	  Chileans	  were	  becoming	  increasingly	  more	  aware	  and	  
discontent	  over	  the	  significant	  foreign	  control	  of	  the	  natural	  resources	  that	  accounted	  
for	  a	  large	  percentage	  of	  the	  national	  economy.	  	  This	  discontentment	  gave	  rise	  to	  the	  
first	  major	  leftist	  political	  movements	  in	  Chile,	  which,	  in	  the	  words	  of	  Brian	  Loveman:	  
sought	  continually	  to	  undermine	  the	  position	  of	  United	  States	  firms,	  attacking	  
the	  exploitation	  of	  Chilean	  resources	  by	  international	  monopolies	  and	  
imperialism	  –	  already	  by	  then	  a	  synonym	  for	  the	  United	  States.5	  	  
The	  U.S.	  was	  put	  in	  a	  precarious	  position	  by	  continuing	  its	  investments	  and	  business	  
practices	  in	  the	  face	  of	  the	  “advent	  of	  the	  popular-­‐front	  government	  with	  Marxist	  
participation.”6	  	  However,	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Chile	  were	  able	  to	  reach	  a	  compromise.	  	  
Chile	  needed	  funds	  for	  economic	  modernization	  and	  industrialization	  and	  was	  able	  to	  
avoid	  increasing	  taxes	  by	  opting	  for	  foreign	  investment	  as	  the	  primary	  source	  of	  capital.	  	  
The	  U.S.,	  in	  turn,	  was	  able	  to	  maintain	  and	  increase	  its	  investments	  while	  supporting	  the	  
anti-­‐Marxists	  in	  the	  popular-­‐front	  and	  establishing	  a	  vital	  source	  of	  copper	  for	  World	  
War	  II.	  	  In	  1940,	  the	  U.S.	  provided	  a	  $17	  million	  credit	  to	  CORFO	  (Corporación	  de	  
Fomento	  de	  la	  Producción	  de	  Chile),	  a	  Chilean	  governmental	  organization	  created	  to	  
promote	  economic	  growth.	  	  The	  funds	  had	  to	  be	  used	  “exclusively	  to	  pay	  for	  materials,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Brian	  Loveman.	  Chile:	  The	  Legacy	  of	  Hispanic	  Capitalism,	  Third	  Edition	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2001),	  
217.	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  217.	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machinery,	  technical	  assistance,	  or	  consultants	  from	  the	  United	  States.”7	  	  Over	  the	  next	  
eight	  years,	  Eximbank	  and	  other	  American	  financial	  institutions	  continued	  contributing	  
to	  CORFO,	  expanding	  markets	  for	  U.S.	  exports	  and	  further	  tightening	  the	  U.S.’s	  
economic	  hold	  on	  Chile.	  
	   As	  economic	  ties	  with	  Chile	  grew,	  American	  involvement	  in	  Chilean	  politics	  
became	  increasingly	  important.	  	  As	  Brian	  Loveman	  said:	  
American	  control	  of	  Chile’s	  principal	  economic	  resources	  accompanied	  
intensified	  involvement	  in	  Chilean	  politics.	  Cold	  War	  intrigue	  made	  post-­‐World	  
War	  II	  Chilean	  politics	  a	  confrontation	  zone	  for	  “Communism”	  and	  the	  “Free	  
World.”	  American	  policy-­‐makers	  considered	  the	  presence	  of	  Communist	  
ministers	  in	  the	  González	  Videla	  government	  to	  be	  dangerous,	  and	  so	  allied	  with	  
the	  Chilean	  Right	  in	  an	  active	  campaign	  to	  weaken,	  then	  destroy,	  Marxist	  
political	  parties	  and	  the	  labor	  movement…	  The	  United	  States	  gave	  badly	  needed	  
financial	  assistance	  to	  the	  Chilean	  government	  on	  the	  condition	  that	  the	  
Communist	  menace	  be	  eliminated.8	  
Soon	  enough,	  González	  Videla,	  who	  had	  been	  elected	  with	  direct	  support	  from	  the	  
Communists,	  moved	  sharply	  to	  the	  right.	  	  In	  1948,	  two	  years	  after	  his	  election,	  the	  
president	  outlawed	  the	  Communist	  Party,	  “authorized	  the	  confinement	  of	  communist	  
leaders	  in	  remote	  parts	  of	  the	  country”,	  and	  cut	  ties	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union.9,10	  	  After	  this	  
political	  about-­‐face,	  foreign	  loans	  to	  Chilean	  governmental	  agencies	  quadrupled	  in	  two	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  Brian	  Loveman.	  Chile:	  The	  Legacy	  of	  Hispanic	  Capitalism.	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8	  Ibid.,	  218-­‐219.	  
9	  Torcuato	  S.	  Di	  Tella.	  History	  Of	  Political	  Parties	  In	  Twentieth-­‐Century	  Latin	  America	  (New	  Brunswick:	  
Transaction	  Publishers,	  2004),	  84.	  
10	  John	  M.	  Kline.	  Foreign	  Investment	  Strategies	  In	  Restructuring	  Economies:	  Learning	  From	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years.11	  	  Gonzaléz	  Videla	  had	  made	  the	  decision	  to	  appease	  the	  United	  States,	  taking	  a	  
side	  in	  the	  emerging	  Cold	  War,	  in	  return	  for	  continuing	  economic	  support.	  	  Gonzaléz	  
Videla	  held	  the	  presidency	  for	  only	  one	  term,	  from	  1946	  until	  1952.	  	  During	  his	  
administration,	  he	  lost	  the	  fragile	  unity	  between	  the	  right-­‐wing	  parties	  and	  socialists	  
that	  kept	  his	  rule	  afloat,	  and	  mid-­‐term	  parliamentary	  elections	  lost	  him	  his	  
congressional	  majority,	  sapping	  his	  ability	  to	  conduct	  any	  major	  policy	  moves.12	  
	   In	  1952,	  Salvador	  Allende	  made	  his	  first	  bid	  for	  the	  presidency.	  	  He	  was	  soundly	  
defeated	  by	  Carlos	  Ibáñez,	  the	  man	  who	  ruled	  Chile	  as	  a	  dictator	  between	  1927	  and	  
1931.	  	  Ibáñez,	  like	  Juan	  Perón	  in	  Argentina,	  succeeded	  in	  establishing	  a	  strong	  rightwing	  
administration	  in	  Chile.	  	  He	  was	  seen	  by	  some	  as	  a	  “Chilean	  version	  of	  Perón”,	  but	  his	  
support	  base	  fractured	  into	  three	  relatively	  evenly	  sized	  tiers	  –	  the	  National	  Party	  on	  the	  
Right,	  the	  Communist	  and	  Socialist	  parties	  on	  the	  left,	  and	  the	  Radical	  and	  Christian	  
Democrat	  parties	  in	  the	  Center	  –	  early	  on	  in	  his	  presidency.13	  	  Since	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  
20th	  century,	  the	  United	  States’	  attempts	  at	  controlling	  the	  price	  of	  Chilean	  copper	  had	  
created	  rifts	  between	  the	  two	  countries.	  	  Ibáñez	  increased	  the	  level	  of	  uncertainty	  
between	  the	  two	  nations	  when	  he	  promised	  a	  more	  independent	  approach	  to	  foreign	  
policy.	  	  In	  1951,	  as	  a	  senator,	  Ibáñez	  voted	  against	  the	  ratification	  of	  the	  military	  pact	  
with	  the	  United	  States.	  	  However,	  the	  two	  nations’	  economies	  were	  still	  inextricably	  
tied,	  as	  evidenced	  by	  the	  sharp	  rise	  in	  inflation	  caused	  by	  reduced	  U.S.	  imports	  of	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  John	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  Kline.	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  Encyclopedia	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http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/111326/Chile/25266/The-­‐Radical-­‐presidencies-­‐1938-­‐
52?anchor=ref268312	  
13	  Torcuato	  S.	  Di	  Tella.	  History	  Of	  Political	  Parties	  In	  Twentieth-­‐Century	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Chilean	  copper	  following	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Korean	  War.14	  	  Ibáñez	  never	  was	  able	  to	  repair	  
Chile’s	  economy	  which	  was	  hurt	  by	  falling	  copper	  prices	  and	  inflation	  during	  his	  
presidency,	  and	  he	  did	  not	  seek	  reelection	  in	  1958.	  
	   In	  1958,	  Jorge	  Alessandri,	  a	  conservative,	  was	  elected	  president.	  	  He	  narrowly	  
defeated	  Salvador	  Allende,	  edging	  the	  emerging	  leftist	  by	  a	  mere	  2%.15	  	  Allende,	  though	  
defeated	  in	  his	  second	  consecutive	  election,	  succeeded	  in	  establishing	  a	  coalition	  –	  
known	  as	  FRAP	  (Popular	  Action	  Front)	  –	  between	  the	  long-­‐at-­‐odds	  Communist	  and	  
Socialist	  parties.	  	  Allende	  had	  already	  attracted	  the	  attention	  of	  United	  Sates	  officials	  in	  
response	  to	  growing	  fears	  of	  communism	  in	  Chile,	  but	  this	  near	  political	  victory	  created	  
much	  worry.	  	  Alessandri,	  as	  encouraged	  by	  the	  United	  States,	  steadily	  reduced	  tariffs	  
during	  the	  first	  years	  of	  his	  presidency.	  	  This	  action	  was	  of	  great	  benefit	  to	  U.S.	  
exporters	  who	  flooded	  Chilean	  markets	  with	  their	  goods.16	  	  These	  policies	  angered	  the	  
working	  class,	  who	  took	  to	  the	  polls	  and	  significantly	  weakened	  Alessandri’s	  power	  in	  
the	  1961	  congressional	  elections.	  	  Again,	  economic	  troubles	  doomed	  Alessandri	  to	  a	  
one-­‐term	  presidency.	  
	   For	  the	  1964	  election,	  President	  John	  F.	  Kennedy	  tried	  to	  impede	  Salvador	  
Allende’s	  election	  at	  virtually	  all	  costs.	  	  Coming	  off	  of	  a	  near	  victory	  six	  years	  earlier,	  and	  
immediately	  following	  the	  perceived	  failure	  of	  a	  conservative	  presidency,	  Allende	  was	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  Julio	  Faúndez.	  Marxism	  and	  Democracy	  in	  Chile:	  From	  1932	  to	  the	  Fall	  of	  Allende	  (New	  Haven:	  Yale	  
University	  Press,	  1988),	  106.	  
15	  Ibid.,	  109.	  
16	  Barbara	  Stallings.	  Class	  Conflict	  and	  Economic	  Development	  in	  Chile,	  1958-­‐1973	  (Palo	  Alto,	  California:	  
Stanford	  University	  Press,	  1978),	  33.	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again	  seen	  as	  a	  major	  contender	  in	  1964.	  	  Starting	  in	  April	  of	  1962,	  the	  5412	  Panel	  
Special	  Group,	  a	  sub-­‐cabinet	  body	  tasked	  with	  reviewing	  proposed	  covert	  actions,	  
approved	  a	  proposal	  to	  begin	  covert	  financial	  assistance	  to	  the	  Christian	  Democratic	  
Party	  (PDC)	  in	  support	  of	  Eduardo	  Frei’s	  candidacy	  for	  the	  1964	  election.	  	  The	  same	  
year,	  the	  CIA	  began	  a	  propaganda	  campaign	  in	  Chile,	  which	  involved	  distributing	  posters	  
and	  leaflets,	  anti-­‐communist	  projects,	  and	  organizing	  slum	  dwellers	  and	  peasants	  to	  
vote	  against	  Allende.17	  	  The	  CIA	  also	  contributed	  $2.5	  million	  in	  direct	  campaign	  
donations	  to	  Frei,	  which	  accounted	  for	  more	  than	  half	  of	  his	  campaign’s	  financing.18	  	  
Additionally,	  the	  CIA	  funded	  other	  political	  parties	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  divert	  votes	  away	  
from	  Allende.	  	  The	  covert	  campaign	  was	  a	  success,	  and	  Eduardo	  Frei	  won	  the	  election	  by	  
around	  18%	  of	  the	  vote.19	  	  Frei	  came	  to	  power	  at	  the	  height	  of	  the	  Alliance	  for	  Progress	  
program.	  	  The	  objectives	  of	  this	  program	  were	  twofold:	  	  
An	  immediate	  objective,	  aimed	  at	  defeating	  the	  Marxists	  through	  the	  ballot	  box;	  
and	  a	  long-­‐term	  objective	  ,	  which	  envisaged	  destroying	  the	  social	  base	  of	  
support	  of	  the	  Marxist	  parties	  through	  the	  modernization	  of	  the	  country’s	  social	  
and	  economic	  structures.20	  
The	  United	  States	  continued	  to	  lend	  and	  invest	  in	  Chile,	  and	  even	  provided	  subsidized	  
food	  aid	  for	  a	  shortage	  during	  Frei’s	  presidency.21	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  Central	  Intelligence	  Agency.	  “CIA	  Activities	  in	  Chile.”	  Released	  under	  Intelligence	  Authorization	  Act	  
(September	  19,	  2000).	  http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/news/20000919/01-­‐01.htm.	  
18	  Rabe,	  Stephen	  G.	  The	  Most	  Dangerous	  Area	  In	  The	  World:	  John	  F.	  Kennedy	  Confronts	  Communist	  
Revolution	  In	  Latin	  America	  (Chapel	  Hill:	  University	  of	  North	  Carolina	  Press,	  1999),	  114.	  
19	  “Elección	  Presidencial	  1964.”	  http://eleccion.atspace.com/presidente1964.htm.	  
20	  Julio	  Faúndez.	  Marxism	  and	  Democracy	  in	  Chile.	  	  127.	  
21	  Ibid.,	  131.	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   The	  1970	  Chilean	  presidential	  election	  proved	  a	  pivotal	  event	  for	  world	  affairs.	  	  
Salvador	  Allende,	  running	  for	  the	  third	  time,	  finally	  achieved	  a	  narrow	  victory.	  	  The	  CIA	  
had	  ramped	  up	  its	  efforts	  to	  stop	  Allende,	  engaging	  in	  “spoiling	  operations”	  to	  prevent	  
his	  election,	  and	  increasing	  propaganda	  campaigns,	  moving	  into	  radio	  and	  news	  media	  
in	  an	  attempt	  to	  link	  Allende	  with	  violence	  and	  repression	  associated	  with	  worldwide	  
communism.22	  	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  KGB	  was	  attempting	  to	  influence	  the	  election	  
results	  in	  the	  opposite	  direction,	  allocating	  $450,000	  directly	  to	  Allende.23	  	  Allende	  won	  
the	  general	  election	  by	  a	  margin	  of	  1%	  over	  Jorge	  Alessandri,	  not	  enough	  to	  be	  
considered	  an	  absolute	  majority.	  	  The	  election	  then	  required	  a	  further	  vote	  by	  the	  
National	  Congress	  to	  determine	  a	  winner.	  	  At	  this	  point,	  the	  CIA	  was	  given	  two	  proposed	  
tracks	  of	  action	  by	  the	  State	  Department.	  	  Track	  I	  read,	  “To	  block	  Allende	  from	  taking	  
office	  after	  the	  4	  September	  election,	  CIA	  sought	  to	  influence	  a	  Congressional	  run-­‐off	  
vote	  required	  by	  the	  Constitution	  because	  Allende	  did	  not	  win	  an	  absolute	  majority.”24	  	  
If	  this	  track	  was	  to	  fail,	  in	  Track	  II,	  “CIA	  was	  directed	  to	  seek	  to	  instigate	  a	  coup	  to	  
prevent	  Allende	  from	  taking	  office.”25	  	  In	  preparation	  for	  the	  run-­‐off,	  the	  KGB	  allocated	  
further	  funds	  to	  ensure	  an	  Allende	  victory.	  	  Allende	  won	  the	  run-­‐off	  resoundingly,	  which	  
prompted	  Nixon	  to	  express	  his	  anger	  over	  the	  CIA’s	  failure,	  and	  CIA	  director	  Richard	  
Helms	  to	  complain	  he	  was	  ordered	  to	  “beat	  somebody	  with	  nothing.”26	  	  In	  a	  last	  ditch	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  Central	  Intelligence	  Agency.	  “CIA	  Activities	  in	  Chile.”	  
23	  Vasili	  Mitrokhin	  and	  Christopher	  Andrew.	  The	  World	  Was	  Going	  Our	  Way:	  The	  KGB	  and	  the	  Battle	  for	  
the	  Third	  World	  (New	  York:	  Basic	  Books,	  2005),	  69-­‐88.	  
24	  Central	  Intelligence	  Agency.	  “CIA	  Activities	  in	  Chile.”	  
25	  Ibid..	  
26	  Vasili	  Mitrokhin	  and	  Christopher	  Andrew.	  The	  World	  Was	  Going	  Our	  Way.	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effort	  to	  avoid	  Allende	  taking	  office,	  the	  CIA	  moved	  forward	  with	  their	  Track	  II	  plan.	  	  
According	  to	  declassified	  CIA	  documents:	  
[The]	  CIA	  was	  working	  with	  three	  different	  groups	  of	  [coup]	  plotters.	  	  All	  three	  
groups	  made	  it	  clear	  that	  any	  coup	  would	  require	  the	  kidnapping	  of	  Army	  
Commander	  Rene	  Schneider,	  who	  felt	  deeply	  that	  the	  Constitution	  required	  that	  
the	  Army	  allow	  Allende	  to	  assume	  power.	  	  CIA	  disagreed	  with	  that	  assessment.	  	  
Although	  CIA	  provided	  weapons	  to	  one	  of	  the	  groups,	  we	  [the	  Church	  
Committee,	  a	  Senate	  committee	  investigating	  intelligence	  gathering	  by	  the	  CIA	  
and	  FBI	  after	  the	  Watergate	  affair]	  have	  found	  no	  information	  that	  the	  plotters’	  
or	  CIA’s	  intention	  was	  for	  the	  general	  to	  be	  killed.	  	  Contact	  with	  one	  group	  of	  
plotters	  was	  dropped	  early	  on	  because	  of	  its	  extremist	  tendencies.	  	  CIA	  provided	  
tear	  gas,	  submachine-­‐guns	  and	  ammunition	  to	  the	  second	  group.	  	  The	  third	  
group	  attempted	  to	  kidnap	  Schneider,	  mortally	  wounding	  him	  in	  the	  attack.	  	  CIA	  
had	  previously	  encouraged	  this	  group	  to	  launch	  a	  coup	  but	  withdrew	  support	  
four	  days	  before	  the	  attack	  because,	  in	  CIA’s	  assessment,	  the	  group	  could	  not	  
carry	  it	  out	  successfully.27	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Chapter	  4:	  Nixon	  vs.	  Allende	  and	  the	  Demise	  of	  Chilean	  Democracy.	  
	  
“The	  U.S.	  bears	  major	  responsibility	  for	  what	  happened	  in	  Chile…	  	  The	  Chilean	  
economy,	  we	  now	  might	  say,	  was	  sentenced	  to	  hang	  from	  its	  neck	  and	  turn	  
slowly	  in	  the	  wind…	  By	  placing	  private	  interests	  above	  the	  survival	  of	  democratic	  
institutions	  in	  Chile,	  our	  government	  has	  directly	  contributed	  to	  the	  death	  of	  yet	  
another	  free	  government	  in	  the	  hemisphere.”	  1	  –	  Laurence	  Birns	  
	  
In	  November	  of	  1970,	  Salvador	  Allende,	  a	  man	  with	  open	  friendships	  with	  the	  
Soviet	  Union,	  who	  had	  declared	  his	  support	  for	  Fidel	  Castro	  and	  condemned	  the	  U.S.	  
invasion	  of	  the	  Bay	  of	  Pigs,	  was	  democratically	  elected	  President	  of	  Chile.	  	  The	  U.S.	  had	  
tried	  in	  vain	  to	  prevent	  Allende’s	  assumption	  of	  the	  Presidency,	  but	  immediately	  upon	  
his	  election	  the	  efforts	  switched	  to	  overthrowing	  Allende.	  	  According	  to	  CIA	  documents	  
released	  under	  the	  Freedom	  of	  Information	  Act,	  “The	  CIA	  was	  instructed	  to	  put	  the	  US	  
Government	  in	  a	  position	  to	  take	  future	  advantage	  of	  either	  a	  political	  or	  military	  
solution	  to	  the	  Chilean	  dilemma,	  depending	  on	  how	  developments	  unfolded.”2	  	  Yet	  one	  
large	  question	  hangs	  over	  President	  Nixon’s	  actions:	  Why	  did	  he	  perceive	  Allende	  as	  
such	  a	  major	  threat?	  	  Allende	  was	  marketed	  to	  the	  American	  people	  as	  a	  dangerous	  
communist,	  resembling	  Fidel	  Castro	  in	  his	  hatred	  of	  America	  and	  willingness	  to	  allow	  a
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Laurence	  Birns.	  “The	  Demise	  of	  a	  Constitutional	  Society,”	  in	  The	  End	  of	  Chilean	  Democracy:	  An	  IDOC	  
Dossier	  On	  The	  Coup	  And	  Its	  Aftermath,	  ed.	  Laurence	  Birns	  (New	  York:	  Seabury	  Press,	  1974),	  26-­‐27.	  
2	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  State	  –	  Freedom	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  Information	  Act.	  “Hinchey	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Soviet	  military	  presence	  in	  his	  country.	  	  However,	  as	  Hal	  Brands	  points	  out,	  “even	  
though	  Allende	  had	  been	  a	  KGB	  asset	  for	  years,	  official	  Soviet-­‐Chilean	  cooperation	  never	  
amounted	  to	  much.”1	  	  In	  reality,	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  mainly	  supported	  Chile	  as	  an	  
economic	  and	  ideological	  ally,	  but,	  “Moscow	  made	  it	  clear	  that	  it	  had	  no	  desire	  for	  a	  
Cuba-­‐style	  relationship	  with	  Chile,	  and	  offered	  little	  protest	  as	  U.S.	  intrigues	  became	  
more	  obvious	  during	  1972-­‐1973.”2	  	  Much	  of	  the	  reasoning	  behind	  this	  cold	  treatment	  of	  
what	  some	  thought	  was	  a	  crucial	  ally	  for	  the	  Soviets	  stemmed	  from	  Moscow’s	  doubt	  
that	  Allende	  would	  be	  able	  to	  hold	  power	  for	  long,	  and	  from	  lack	  of	  “desire	  to	  pour	  
resources	  into	  a	  losing	  cause.”3	  	  Since	  Chile	  never	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  a	  strategic	  threat	  to	  
American	  dominance	  in	  the	  region,	  there	  were	  clearly	  other	  motives	  behind	  Nixon’s	  
desire	  to	  oust	  Allende.	  
Scholars	  believe	  that	  two	  key	  factors	  in	  relations	  with	  Chile	  were	  Nixon’s	  desire	  
to	  appear	  strong	  to	  the	  international	  community	  after	  years	  of	  relative	  decline	  in	  U.S.	  
power,	  and	  economic	  fears	  over	  threats	  of	  nationalization	  of	  U.S.	  interests	  by	  Allende.	  	  
Scholars	  have	  asserted	  that	  both	  Castro	  and	  Allende	  underestimated	  the	  level	  of	  
response	  their	  rises	  to	  power	  would	  elicit	  from	  the	  United	  States,	  which	  in	  Allende’s	  
case	  was	  a	  fatal	  mistake.	  	  As	  Hal	  Brands	  said:	  
Whereas	  Allende	  and	  Castro	  had	  calculated	  that	  the	  decline	  of	  U.S.	  power	  would	  
inhibit	  Washington	  from	  acting	  forcefully	  in	  Latin	  America,	  the	  actual	  outcome	  
was	  precisely	  the	  opposite.	  Realizing	  that	  the	  unveiling	  of	  the	  “Nixon	  Doctrine”	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Hal	  Brands.	  Latin	  America's	  Cold	  War.	  	  151.	  
2	  Ibid.,	  151.	  
3	  Ibid.,	  151.	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and	  U.S.	  Withdrawal	  from	  Vietnam	  were	  tacit	  admissions	  that	  the	  United	  States	  
was	  in	  relative	  decline,	  Nixon	  and	  Kissinger	  felt	  pressed	  to	  show	  that	  Washington	  
would	  still	  act	  forcefully	  on	  behalf	  of	  its	  interests.4	  
Brands	  goes	  even	  further,	  asserting	  that	  Nixon	  had	  a	  personal	  vendetta	  towards	  
Allende,	  perhaps	  created	  by	  his	  failure	  to	  prevent	  the	  election	  of	  the	  Chilean	  leader:	  
“The	  fear	  of	  looking	  weak	  fueled	  Nixon’s	  near-­‐obsession	  with	  toppling	  the	  Chilean	  
president.”5	  	  
	  Economic	  fears	  likely	  played	  a	  bigger	  role	  in	  influencing	  U.S.	  foreign	  policy	  
towards	  Chile.	  	  During	  the	  1960s,	  economic	  nationalism	  had	  swept	  across	  Latin	  America	  
reaching	  levels	  that	  led	  scholar	  David	  Lehmann	  to	  label	  this	  trend	  an	  “ideological	  
movement.”6	  	  Latin	  American	  governments	  sought	  to	  weaken	  Washington’s	  influence	  in	  
their	  countries	  by	  attacking	  American	  capital.	  	  Notable	  examples	  of	  such	  nationalization	  
took	  place	  in	  Cuba,	  Bolivia,	  Jamaica,	  and	  Guyana.7	  	  This	  trend	  was	  obviously	  of	  major	  
concern	  to	  U.S.	  interests,	  as	  over	  the	  preceding	  century	  American	  corporations	  had	  
developed	  extensive	  reach	  across	  Latin	  America.	  	  As	  early	  as	  1964,	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  
preserve	  their	  interests,	  corporations	  offered	  financial	  assistance	  to	  help	  the	  CIA	  
prevent	  Allende’s	  election,	  but	  these	  early	  offers	  were	  mostly	  rejected.8	  	  Yet	  as	  Allende	  
rose	  to	  power,	  the	  Nixon	  administration	  began	  to	  heed	  the	  desires	  of	  American	  business	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  Hal	  Brands.	  Latin	  America’s	  Cold	  War.	  	  148.	  
5	  Ibid.,	  149.	  
6	  David	  Lehmann.	  Democracy	  and	  Development	  in	  Latin	  America	  (Philadelphia:	  Temple	  University	  Press,	  
1992),	  48-­‐51.	  
7	  Hal	  Brands.	  Latin	  America’s	  Cold	  War.	  	  144.	  
8	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  State	  –	  Freedom	  of	  Information	  Act.	  “Hinchey	  Report:	  CIA	  Activities	  in	  Chile.”	  	  
September	  18,	  2000.	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interests.	  	  As	  Laurence	  Birns,	  in	  his	  essay	  “The	  Demise	  of	  a	  Constitutional	  Society,”	  
pointed	  out,	  “the	  aims	  of	  a	  handful	  of	  U.S.	  corporations	  [were]	  transmuted	  into	  U.S.	  
foreign	  policy.	  	  The	  Nixon	  administration	  adhered	  to	  the	  desires	  of	  corporations	  with	  
major	  interests	  in	  Chile,	  and	  in	  doing	  so	  placed	  “private	  interests	  above	  the	  survival	  of	  
democratic	  institutions	  in	  Chile.”9	  	  One	  major	  example	  of	  corporate	  attempts	  to	  
influence	  U.S.	  foreign	  policy	  in	  Chile	  is	  the	  International	  Telephone	  and	  Telegraph	  Corp,	  
an	  American	  company	  which	  owned	  a	  controlling	  share	  of	  the	  Chilean	  Telephone	  
Company.	  	  According	  to	  Tad	  Szulc,	  “International	  Telephone	  and	  Telegraph	  Corp.	  had	  
offered	  the	  CIA	  $1	  million	  in	  1970	  to	  prevent	  Allende’s	  election	  and	  subsequently	  
proposed	  a	  detailed	  plan	  to	  plunge	  Chile	  into	  economic	  chaos.”10	  
Salvador	  Allende	  ran	  for	  the	  presidency	  on	  the	  premise	  of	  the	  Via	  Chilena	  Al	  
Socialismo	  (Chilean	  Path	  to	  Socialism).	  	  He	  promised	  to	  “expropriate	  foreign	  holdings	  in	  
the	  major	  industries,	  central	  to	  his	  project	  for	  revolutionizing	  Chilean	  society.”11	  	  He	  
railed	  against	  the	  “imperialist	  forms	  of	  dependency	  and	  exploitation	  perpetuated	  by	  the	  
United	  States.”12	  	  Fearing	  another	  Cuba,	  where	  Fidel	  Castro	  expropriated	  over	  $1	  billion	  
in	  American	  investments,	  Nixon	  began	  to	  impose	  massive	  sanctions	  against	  Allende	  to	  
supplement	  the	  covert	  activity	  designed	  to	  weaken	  the	  socialist	  regime.	  	  Tad	  Szulc	  
described	  Nixon’s	  policies	  thusly:	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  Laurence	  Birns.	  “The	  Demise	  of	  a	  Constitutional	  Society,”	  in	  The	  End	  of	  Chilean	  Democracy),	  26-­‐27.	  
10	  Tad	  Szulc.	  “The	  CIA	  and	  Chile,”	  in	  The	  End	  of	  Chilean	  Democracy,	  159.	  
11	  Hal	  Brands.	  Latin	  America's	  Cold	  War.	  136.	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  Ibid.,	  136.	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For	  the	  next	  three	  years,	  the	  U.S.	  policy	  developed	  along	  two	  principal	  
lines.	  	  One	  was	  the	  denial	  of	  all	  credits	  to	  the	  Allende	  government	  –	  Washington	  
even	  blocked	  loans	  by	  international	  institutions	  –	  to	  aggravate	  Chile’s	  economic	  
situation	  when	  Allende	  himself	  was	  bogging	  down	  in	  vast	  mismanagement	  of	  his	  
own.	  	  The	  other	  line	  was	  the	  supportive	  CIA	  activity	  to	  accelerate	  the	  economic	  
crisis	  and	  thereby	  encourage	  domestic	  opposition	  to	  Allende’s	  Marxist	  Popular	  
Unity	  government	  coalition.	  	  The	  only	  exception	  to	  the	  ban	  on	  credits	  was	  the	  
sale	  of	  military	  equipment	  to	  the	  Chilean	  armed	  forces.13	  
In	  spite	  of	  these	  crackdowns,	  Allende	  made	  a	  pivotal	  move	  on	  September	  29,	  
1971.	  	  In	  what	  proved	  to	  be	  a	  fatal	  mistake,	  Allende	  announced	  the	  total	  nationalization	  
of	  American	  copper	  holdings	  in	  Chile	  with	  no	  compensation	  due	  to	  “excess	  profits”	  
earned	  by	  them	  in	  the	  past.14	  	  This	  was	  the	  attack	  on	  U.S.	  interests	  that	  corporate	  
leaders	  and	  politicians	  feared	  all	  along.	  	  In	  response,	  the	  United	  States	  ramped	  up	  its	  
efforts	  to	  destroy	  Allende.	  	  Robert	  S.	  McNamara,	  President	  of	  the	  World	  Bank	  and	  
former	  U.S.	  Secretary	  of	  Defense,	  “warned	  developing	  countries	  that	  a	  ‘disquieting’	  
trend	  by	  governments	  to	  annul	  agreements	  with	  foreign	  investors	  could	  ‘seriously	  
imperil’	  their	  creditworthiness	  and	  inhibit	  investment	  in	  their	  entire	  region.”15	  	  Indeed,	  
in	  an	  effort	  to	  fulfill	  McNamara’s	  prophecy,	  U.S.	  and	  international	  organizations	  ceased	  
lending	  and	  investment	  into	  Chile	  altogether.	  	  The	  State	  Department	  blocked	  Eximbank	  
(the	  Treasury	  Department’s	  Export-­‐Import	  Bank)	  loans	  to	  Chile,	  according	  to	  Joseph	  
Collins:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  Tad	  Szulc.	  “The	  CIA	  and	  Chile,”	  in	  The	  End	  of	  Chilean	  Democracy,	  155.	  
14	  James	  Petras	  and	  Morris	  Morley.	  The	  United	  States	  And	  Chile:	  Imperialism	  And	  The	  Overthrow	  Of	  The	  
Allende	  Government	  (New	  York	  and	  London:	  Monthly	  Review	  Press,	  1975),	  87.	  
15	  Ibid.,	  	  88.	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Under	  pressure	  from	  American	  companies…,	  [and]	  suspended	  the	  guarantee	  
and	  insurance	  program	  for	  commercial	  banks	  and	  exporters.	  Private	  banks	  and	  
suppliers	  immediately	  took	  the	  cue	  from	  the	  Treasury’s	  Eximbank.	  	  This	  short	  
term	  credit	  cut-­‐off	  was	  tantamount	  to	  the	  formal	  blockade	  of	  Cuba	  –	  only	  it	  was	  
‘low	  profile’	  and	  thus	  did	  not	  run	  the	  risk	  of	  attack	  by	  Congress	  or	  public	  opinion.	  
The	  total	  impact	  was	  devastating.	  	  By	  1972,	  not	  only	  had	  Chile’s	  imports	  declined	  
but	  the	  percentage	  of	  total	  imports	  from	  the	  U.S.	  plummeted	  from	  40	  per	  cent	  
to	  around	  15	  per	  cent.	  	  The	  lack	  of	  replacement	  parts	  for	  machinery	  of	  U.S.	  origin	  
(the	  bulk	  of	  machinery	  in	  Chile)	  brought	  about	  serious	  production	  
bottlenecks.	  	  The	  forced	  decline	  in	  imports	  mainly	  affected	  the	  middle	  class	  
which	  was	  accustomed	  to	  imported	  goods	  and	  services.16	  
Between	  1959	  and	  the	  election	  of	  Allende,	  The	  Inter-­‐American	  Development	  Banks	  (in	  
which	  American	  executives	  wielded	  veto	  power)	  granted	  59	  loans	  totaling	  over	  $310	  
million	  to	  Chile.	  	  After	  Allende’s	  election	  and	  his	  expropriations	  without	  compensation,	  
loans	  were	  denied	  despite	  Chile’s	  good	  repayment	  record.17	  	  The	  World	  Bank	  followed	  
suit.	  	  Prior	  to	  Allende’s	  election,	  Chile	  had	  received	  over	  $200	  million	  in	  World	  Bank	  
loans.	  	  These	  loans	  ceased	  after	  the	  election	  of	  Allende.	  	  Interestingly,	  I.M.F.	  support	  for	  
Chile	  continued	  under	  Allende,	  perhaps	  due	  to	  Europe’s	  stronger	  relative	  influence	  with	  
this	  institution.18	  	  	  
Chile’s	  economy	  depended	  heavily	  on	  imports	  (over	  30%	  of	  its	  food	  and	  machine	  
parts,	  much	  of	  which	  came	  from	  the	  U.S.)	  and	  the	  price	  of	  its	  main	  export,	  copper,	  was	  
tumbling.	  	  Additionally,	  Allende	  inherited	  the	  world’s	  second	  highest	  per	  capita	  foreign	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  Joseph	  Collins.	  “Tightening	  the	  Financial	  Knot,”	  in	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debt.	  	  Thus,	  Allende’s	  Chile	  was	  a	  prime	  target	  for	  economic	  warfare.19	  	  As	  the	  economic	  
situation	  in	  Chile	  worsened,	  a	  direct	  result	  of	  American	  efforts,	  discontent	  grew	  among	  
the	  middle	  class	  and	  military	  –	  as	  was	  the	  design	  of	  these	  measures	  all	  along.	  	  In	  the	  
words	  of	  Laurence	  Birns,	  the	  United	  States’:	  
systematic	  policy	  of	  economic	  strangulation	  created	  a	  momentum	  which	  led	  to	  
the	  death	  of	  constitutional	  democracy.	  	  This	  policy	  reflected	  the	  demands	  of	  the	  
American	  corporations	  that	  had	  been	  nationalized	  or	  controlled	  in	  Chile…	  	  Cut	  
off	  from	  the	  funds	  on	  which	  it	  had	  counted,	  the	  Allende	  government	  was	  unable	  
to	  supply	  that	  nation’s	  middle	  class	  with	  luxuries	  and	  essentials	  to	  which	  it	  was	  
accustomed…	  	  Deprived	  and	  then	  embittered,	  the	  middle-­‐class	  opposition	  
parties	  repeatedly	  pressed	  the	  military	  to	  do	  its	  duty	  and	  come	  out	  of	  the	  
barracks.20	  
As	  Chile’s	  economy	  struggled,	  Allende’s	  policies	  pushed	  the	  already	  strained	  
political	  unity	  that	  had	  allowed	  him	  to	  reach	  the	  presidency.	  	  Allende	  had	  relied	  on	  the	  
Christian	  Democrats’	  congressional	  support	  when	  his	  election	  moved	  to	  a	  runoff,	  but	  
early	  on	  in	  his	  term	  he	  began	  to	  lose	  their	  critical	  backing	  as	  they	  moved	  to	  the	  right.	  	  
Christian	  Democratic	  Senator	  Renán	  Fuentealba,	  in	  a	  1971	  speech,	  “attacked	  Allende’s	  
government’s	  efforts	  to	  take	  over	  the	  mass	  media	  and	  the	  universities,	  criticized	  the	  
‘implacable	  campaign’	  against	  former	  president	  Frei,	  and	  accused	  [Popular	  Unity]	  of	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  Joseph	  Collins.	  “Tightening	  the	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  Knot,”	  in	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  Democracy,	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20	  Laurence	  Birns.	  “The	  Demise	  of	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sectarianism	  and	  antipluralism.”21	  	  Many	  members	  of	  the	  Chilean	  government	  criticized	  
Allende’s	  nationalization	  policies.	  	  Some	  feared	  the	  overly	  socialist	  nature	  of	  the	  
practice,	  and	  some	  questioned	  its	  legality.	  	  The	  National	  Party	  even	  proposed	  the	  
impeachment	  of	  the	  Minister	  of	  the	  Economy,	  seeking	  to	  move	  control	  over	  
nationalizations	  to	  Congress.22	  	  Disagreements	  over	  the	  management	  of	  the	  economy	  
led	  to	  a	  further	  polarization	  of	  the	  Chilean	  government,	  resembling	  the	  nearly	  evenly-­‐
distributed	  deadlocks	  of	  years	  past.	  Anti-­‐government	  parties	  such	  as	  the	  Christian	  
Democrats	  and	  the	  National	  Party	  began	  to	  merge	  their	  strategies	  and	  formed	  CODE	  
(Democratic	  Confederation),	  and	  fractures	  among	  the	  Popular	  Unity	  party	  between	  the	  
Communists	  and	  Socialists	  began	  to	  emerge	  once	  again.23	  	  Opposition	  parties	  began	  
proposing	  amendments	  to	  restructure	  the	  economy	  and	  take	  away	  some	  control	  from	  
Allende.	  	  These	  measures	  sought	  to	  protect	  small	  and	  medium	  property	  owners,	  grant	  
more	  self-­‐management	  to	  workers,	  and	  place	  more	  due	  process	  on	  processes	  like	  
industry	  requisitions,	  allowing	  Supreme	  Court	  appeals	  and	  granting	  business	  owners	  a	  
way	  of	  defending	  their	  ventures.24	  
In	  1971,	  Fidel	  Castro	  visited	  Chile,	  stirring	  up	  more	  controversy	  in	  an	  already	  
tense	  environment.	  	  Castro	  was	  accused	  of	  “interfering	  in	  Chile’s	  internal	  politics”	  by	  the	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  Overthrow	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  Faúndez.	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opposition	  press,	  “particularly	  when	  he	  described	  the	  opposition	  as	  fascists.”25	  	  Castro	  
complained	  that	  his	  crowds	  in	  Chile	  were	  not	  sufficiently	  large	  and	  called	  for	  the	  mass	  
mobilization	  of	  Allende	  supporters	  in	  response	  to	  an	  anti-­‐Allende	  demonstration	  in	  
December	  of	  the	  previous	  year.	  	  The	  demonstration	  was	  known	  as	  the	  “March	  of	  the	  
Empty	  Pots,”	  and	  consisted	  of	  five	  thousand	  women	  protesting	  the	  lack	  of	  food	  and	  the	  
rising	  cost	  of	  living.	  	  Followers	  of	  the	  MIR	  (Revolutionary	  Left	  Movement)	  and	  similar	  
groups	  attacked	  the	  women,	  and	  police	  riot	  squads	  were	  called	  in	  and	  used	  tear	  gas	  
against	  the	  protestors.26	  	  This	  incident	  was	  only	  the	  beginning	  of	  a	  series	  of	  events	  that	  
created	  an	  atmosphere	  of	  violence	  and	  tension	  in	  Chile	  during	  Allende’s	  reign.	  	  
Following	  this	  protest	  the	  Christian	  Democrats	  succeeded	  in	  impeaching	  Allende’s	  
minister	  of	  interior	  for:	  
responsibility	  for	  continued,	  reiterated,	  and	  serious	  infractions	  of	  the	  
constitutional	  guarantees,	  including	  the	  toleration	  of	  illegal	  armed	  groups,	  
arbitrary	  detentions,	  and	  infringement	  of	  constitutional	  provisions	  concerning	  
the	  freedom	  of	  the	  mass	  media.27	  
Though	  Allende	  responded	  to	  this	  impeachment	  by	  moving	  the	  minister,	  one	  of	  his	  most	  
trusted	  aids,	  into	  the	  Defense	  Ministry	  (where	  he	  was	  eventually	  ousted	  by	  the	  Senate),	  
this	  moment	  was	  a	  clear	  indication	  of	  the	  erosion	  of	  Allende’s	  political	  power.	  
	   The	  following	  year,	  1972,	  held	  a	  wave	  of	  large	  strikes	  from	  many	  sectors	  of	  
Chilean	  society.	  	  In	  October,	  of	  1972,	  truck	  drivers	  all	  across	  Chile	  launched	  a	  national	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strike	  due	  to	  lack	  of	  spare	  parts	  for	  their	  trucks	  (a	  direct	  result	  of	  the	  U.S.	  embargo),	  low	  
freight	  rates,	  and	  in	  protest	  of	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  state-­‐owned	  shipping	  agency	  in	  
one	  of	  Chile’s	  southern	  provinces.	  	  This	  strike	  brought	  Chile’s	  consumer	  economy,	  which	  
was	  already	  badly	  affected	  by	  shortages	  and	  rapid	  inflation,	  to	  its	  knees.	  	  The	  National	  
Party	  and	  Christian	  Democratic	  Party	  immediately	  supported	  the	  strike,	  and	  soon	  after,	  
taxi	  drivers,	  shopkeepers,	  the	  Association	  of	  Owners	  of	  Small	  Industries,	  the	  Secondary	  
Students’	  Federation,	  the	  Law	  Society,	  the	  Medical	  Association	  and	  other	  professional	  
and	  technical	  associations	  joined	  the	  truckers	  in	  their	  strike.28	  	  The	  truck	  drivers	  put	  
forth	  a	  specific	  set	  of	  demands	  with	  the	  support	  of	  the	  CDP	  and	  the	  National	  Party:	  	  
The	  government	  should	  enact	  immediately	  the	  constitutional	  amendment	  
reversing	  the	  government’s	  nationalization	  programme,	  that	  grassroots	  
organizations	  should	  not	  be	  involved	  in	  the	  distribution	  of	  consumer	  goods,	  and	  
that	  the	  administrative	  measures	  against	  opposition-­‐controlled	  media	  should	  be	  
lifted.29	  
Faced	  with	  a	  crucial	  task	  of	  maintaining	  a	  critical	  sector	  of	  his	  economy,	  Allende	  
declared	  a	  state	  of	  emergency	  and	  mobilized	  the	  military	  to	  maintain	  public	  order.	  	  By	  
the	  end	  of	  1972,	  the	  strike	  had	  lost	  momentum	  and	  ended.	  However,	  Allende	  still	  had	  
not	  dealt	  with	  his	  country’s	  economic	  problems	  and	  was	  now	  faced	  with	  a	  situation	  of	  
power	  sharing	  with	  the	  military,	  having	  appointed	  cabinet	  members	  from	  the	  armed	  
forces	  to	  maintain	  order	  during	  the	  strike.	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   In	  1973,	  Chile	  held	  a	  Congressional	  election.	  	  Allende’s	  Popular	  Unity	  surprisingly	  
gained	  slightly	  in	  this	  general	  election,	  accumulating	  six	  seats	  in	  the	  Chamber	  of	  
Deputies	  and	  two	  in	  the	  Senate.	  	  However,	  the	  election	  did	  not	  alter	  the	  balance	  of	  
power	  within	  Congress,	  which	  Julio	  Faúndez	  believes	  actually	  increased	  political	  
tensions.	  	  According	  to	  Faúndez:	  
The	  prolongation	  of	  the	  deadlock	  radicalized	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  political	  divide.	  	  
On	  the	  government	  side,	  the	  inconclusive	  results	  strengthened	  the	  radical	  wing	  
of	  the	  Socialist	  party,	  which	  called	  upon	  the	  government	  to	  carry	  out	  a	  truly	  
proletarian	  revolution	  without	  regard	  to	  the	  legal	  niceties	  of	  parliamentary	  
democracy.	  	  On	  the	  opposition	  side	  the	  results	  strengthened	  those	  who	  believed	  
that	  a	  military	  coup	  was	  the	  only	  solution	  to	  the	  crisis.30	  
After	  the	  elections	  were	  held	  and	  the	  strike	  had	  ended,	  the	  military’s	  participation	  in	  
Allende’s	  cabinet	  was	  no	  longer	  justified.	  	  Though	  Allende	  wanted	  to	  keep	  the	  military	  
men	  within	  his	  administration,	  he	  had	  no	  choice	  but	  to	  appoint	  a	  civilian	  cabinet.	  	  CODE	  
(the	  opposition	  coalition)	  had	  been	  hoping	  for	  a	  major	  victory	  in	  the	  Congressional	  
election.	  	  Gaining	  a	  two-­‐thirds	  majority	  would	  have	  allowed	  the	  CDP	  and	  NP	  to	  force	  
Allende	  to	  change	  his	  policies,	  or	  even	  given	  the	  opposition	  the	  power	  of	  impeachment.	  	  
To	  overcome	  the	  challenge	  of	  a	  disappointing	  election,	  CODE,	  using	  former	  President	  
Frei	  as	  their	  spokesperson,	  called	  upon	  the	  people	  of	  Chile	  to	  organize	  themselves	  
against	  the	  “totalitarian	  threat”	  posed	  by	  the	  government.31	  	  This	  call	  to	  arms	  came	  in	  
conjunction	  with	  a	  plea	  to	  Chile’s	  military	  to	  enforce	  the	  Arms	  Control	  Act,	  which	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sanctioned	  left-­‐wing	  organizations	  such	  as	  trade	  unions	  who	  were	  thought	  to	  be	  
preparing	  for	  an	  armed	  struggle.32	  	  This	  rhetoric	  was	  nearly	  tantamount	  to	  an	  overt	  call	  
for	  a	  military	  coup.	  
	   By	  mid-­‐1973,	  Chile’s	  situation	  had	  devolved	  into	  a	  major	  crisis.	  	  In	  April,	  unions	  at	  
the	  El	  Teniente	  copper	  mines	  went	  on	  strike	  over	  wage	  adjustments	  by	  Allende’s	  
government.	  	  The	  opposition	  parties	  sought	  to	  capitalize	  on	  this	  unrest	  by	  attempting	  to	  
include	  miners	  from	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  country	  in	  the	  strike,	  lending	  money	  to	  the	  
strikers,	  and	  impeaching	  the	  Ministers	  of	  Mining	  and	  Labor.	  	  The	  strike	  lasted	  70	  days,	  
and	  severely	  weakened	  the	  government	  economically	  and	  politically.	  	  The	  unions,	  
historically	  allies	  of	  Allende,	  now	  appeared	  to	  oppose	  the	  government,	  and	  relations	  
between	  the	  Communists	  and	  Socialists	  were	  further	  strained.33	  	  On	  June	  29,	  Army	  
Lieutenant	  Colonel	  Roberto	  Souper	  led	  a	  failed	  coup	  attempt	  against	  Allende.	  	  He	  
commanded	  three	  combat	  groups	  of	  tanks	  and	  armored	  cars	  to	  La	  Moneda,	  the	  Chilean	  
Presidential	  Palace,	  and	  began	  firing	  on	  buildings.	  	  The	  Coup,	  which	  had	  been	  organized	  
and	  executed	  by	  members	  of	  the	  extreme	  right-­‐wing	  movement	  Patria	  y	  Libertad	  
(Homeland	  and	  Liberty),	  was	  quickly	  subdued	  by	  other	  members	  of	  the	  military,	  but	  
nonetheless	  signaled	  the	  level	  of	  Chile’s	  political	  deterioration.34	  	  Until	  this	  point,	  talk	  of	  
a	  coup	  had	  been	  nothing	  more	  than	  talk.	  	  Popular	  mobilization	  against	  the	  government	  
increased	  in	  July,	  as	  Chilean	  truck	  drivers	  again	  went	  on	  strike.	  	  The	  strike	  coincided	  with	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an	  outbreak	  of	  terrorism	  by	  right-­‐wing	  militants	  who	  sought	  to	  further	  destabilize	  the	  
Allende	  regime.	  	  From	  July	  27	  to	  August	  3,	  there	  were	  180	  reported	  acts	  of	  terrorism	  
including	  the	  assassination	  of	  a	  presidential	  aid.35	  
Following	  rampant	  accusations	  of	  failing	  to	  uphold	  the	  rule	  of	  law,	  the	  
government	  succeeded	  in	  convincing	  military	  officials	  to	  join	  a	  new	  cabinet,	  known	  as	  
the	  Cabinet	  of	  National	  Security.	  	  The	  cabinet	  was	  intended	  to	  alleviate	  fears	  of	  political	  
destabilization	  and	  rifts	  between	  the	  government	  and	  military,	  but	  eight	  days	  after	  its	  
formation	  the	  air	  force	  chief	  resigned.	  	  Four	  days	  later,	  on	  August	  22,	  “the	  Chamber	  of	  
Deputies	  adopted	  a	  resolution	  calling	  upon	  the	  military	  members	  of	  the	  cabinet	  to	  force	  
the	  government	  to	  act	  within	  the	  law,	  otherwise	  they	  would	  be	  held	  responsible	  for	  
violating	  the	  constitution.”36	  	  The	  resolution	  was	  a	  large	  document	  decrying	  the	  
constitutional	  abuses	  of	  Allende.	  	  Among	  other	  criticisms,	  the	  resolution	  stated:	  	  
It	  is	  a	  fact	  that	  the	  current	  government	  of	  the	  Republic,	  from	  the	  beginning,	  has	  
sought	  to	  conquer	  absolute	  power	  with	  the	  obvious	  purpose	  of	  subjecting	  all	  
citizens	  to	  the	  strictest	  political	  and	  economic	  control	  by	  the	  state	  and,	  in	  this	  
manner,	  fulfilling	  the	  goal	  of	  establishing	  a	  totalitarian	  system:	  the	  absolute	  
opposite	  of	  the	  representative	  democracy	  established	  by	  the	  Constitution.	  
And	  further:	  
[The	  government]	  has	  usurped	  Congress’s	  principle	  role	  of	  legislation	  through	  
the	  adoption	  of	  various	  measures	  of	  great	  importance	  to	  the	  country’s	  social	  and	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economic	  life	  that	  are	  unquestionably	  matters	  of	  legislation	  through	  special	  
decrees	  enacted	  in	  an	  abuse	  of	  power,	  or	  through	  simple	  "administrative	  
resolutions"	  using	  legal	  loopholes.	  It	  is	  noteworthy	  that	  all	  of	  this	  has	  been	  done	  
with	  the	  deliberate	  and	  confessed	  purpose	  of	  substituting	  the	  country’s	  
institutional	  structures,	  as	  conceived	  by	  current	  legislation,	  with	  absolute	  
executive	  authority	  and	  the	  total	  elimination	  of	  legislative	  authority.	  
Finally:	  
Especially	  serious	  is	  the	  breakdown	  of	  the	  Rule	  of	  Law	  by	  means	  of	  the	  creation	  
and	  development	  of	  government-­‐protected	  armed	  groups	  which,	  in	  addition	  to	  
threatening	  citizens’	  security	  and	  rights	  as	  well	  as	  domestic	  peace,	  are	  headed	  
towards	  a	  confrontation	  with	  the	  Armed	  Forces.	  37	  
	   The	  day	  after	  the	  Chamber	  of	  Deputies	  passed	  the	  resolution,	  General	  Carlos	  
Prats,	  under	  strong	  pressure	  from	  the	  military,	  resigned	  from	  the	  cabinet	  and	  his	  
position	  as	  Commander-­‐in-­‐Chief	  of	  the	  army.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  Prats,	  the	  two	  other	  
generals	  who	  had	  defused	  the	  earlier	  failed	  coup	  attempt	  resigned.	  	  Allende’s	  last	  
remaining	  loyal	  generals	  with	  major	  political	  influence	  had	  left	  his	  government.38	  	  After	  
Prats’	  resignation,	  the	  government	  was	  completely	  exposed	  to	  military	  action.	  	  General	  
Augusto	  Pinochet	  was	  appointed	  as	  the	  new	  army	  chief.	  	  The	  right-­‐wing	  magazine	  Qué	  
Pasa	  reported	  that	  though	  Pinochet	  had	  initially	  supported	  Prats,	  Pinochet	  would,	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“reflect	  the	  predominant	  tendency	  in	  the	  high	  command	  which	  is	  clearly	  opposed	  to	  
giving	  political	  support	  to	  the	  Unidad	  Popular.”39	  
	   After	  weeks	  of	  a	  worsening	  economic	  situation	  with	  the	  continuation	  of	  the	  
strikes,	  urgent	  political	  maneuverings	  by	  Allende	  and	  the	  military,	  and	  “suspicious	  troop	  
movements,”40	  the	  formal	  coup	  d’état	  against	  Salvador	  Allende	  began	  on	  September	  11,	  
1973.	  	  Within	  hours	  of	  the	  coup’s	  onset,	  pro-­‐government	  radio	  stations	  had	  been	  taken	  
off	  the	  air	  or	  destroyed,	  the	  presidential	  palace	  had	  been	  bombed,	  and	  Allende	  was	  
dead.	  	  There	  had	  been	  some	  resistance	  from	  Allende	  loyalists,	  but	  overall	  the	  coup	  was	  
swift	  and	  effective.	  	  Allende’s	  death	  was	  officially	  ruled	  a	  suicide,	  but	  some	  evidence	  
including	  medical	  reports	  listing	  two	  bullet	  wounds,	  cloud	  the	  issue	  in	  controversy.41	  	  
After	  the	  dust	  had	  settled,	  General	  Augusto	  Pinochet	  assumed	  power	  as	  the	  new	  
military	  leader	  of	  Chile,	  ushering	  in	  a	  long	  period	  of	  further	  violence	  and	  repression.	  	  
Tellingly,	  according	  to	  Jonathan	  Kandell	  of	  the	  New	  York	  Times,	  “Almost	  immediately	  
following	  the	  overthrow	  of	  Allende,	  loans	  and	  private	  capital	  from	  the	  U.S.	  began	  
flowing	  into	  Chile	  again.”42	  	  Chile’s	  revolutionary	  project	  in	  democratic	  socialism	  had	  
failed,	  and	  as	  far	  as	  the	  United	  States	  was	  concerned,	  order	  had	  been	  restored.
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“These	  are	  my	  last	  words,	  certain	  that	  the	  sacrifice	  will	  not	  be	  in	  vain.	  	  I	  am	  sure	  that	  
there	  will	  be	  at	  least	  a	  moral	  sanction	  that	  will	  punish	  the	  felony,	  the	  cowardice	  and	  
treason.	  	  Workers	  of	  my	  homeland,	  I	  have	  faith	  in	  Chile	  and	  its	  future.	  	  Other	  men	  will	  
overcome	  this	  dark	  and	  bitter	  moment	  when	  treason	  seems	  to	  reign.	  	  You	  must	  never	  
forget	  that	  sooner	  rather	  than	  later	  the	  grand	  avenues	  will	  be	  open	  where	  free	  men	  will	  
march	  on	  to	  build	  a	  better	  society.	  	  Long	  liver	  Chile!	  	  Long	  live	  the	  People!	  	  Long	  live	  the	  
workers!”	  1	  –	  Salvador	  Allende’s	  final	  address,	  September	  11,	  1973	  
	  
	   Salvador	  Allende	  was	  just	  one	  character	  in	  a	  centuries-­‐long	  tale	  of	  the	  United	  
States	  attempting	  to	  mold	  Latin	  America	  to	  its	  desires.	  	  The	  United	  States	  of	  America,	  
worldwide	  champion	  of	  Democracy	  and	  political	  freedom,	  consistently	  operates	  on	  a	  
covert	  level	  to	  preserve	  its	  political	  and	  economic	  interests.	  	  Deposing	  a	  democratically	  
elected	  leader,	  such	  as	  Allende,	  was	  considered	  a	  necessary	  evil	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  
hemispheric	  dominance.	  	  A	  decade	  before	  Allende’s	  rise,	  Fidel	  Castro	  had	  instilled	  fear
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in	  the	  common	  American.	  	  The	  U.S.	  government	  portrayed	  Castro	  as	  a	  dangerous	  tyrant	  
who	  wished	  to	  impose	  communism	  by	  force	  on	  every	  nation	  of	  the	  West.	  	  In	  reality,	  the	  
U.S.	  was	  equally	  –	  if	  not	  more	  –	  concerned	  with	  the	  economic	  threat	  posed	  by	  Castro.	  	  
Nationalizations	  of	  American	  business	  interests	  in	  Cuba	  were	  significant,	  and	  the	  U.S.	  
did	  everything	  it	  could	  to	  contain	  the	  ‘communist	  problem’	  to	  the	  island.	  	  Soon	  after	  
Castro’s	  rise,	  America	  learned	  of	  Salvador	  Allende.	  	  Fearing	  John	  Foster	  Dulles’	  domino	  
theory	  would	  hold	  true	  –	  the	  rise	  of	  a	  communist	  state	  in	  Chile	  would	  soon	  spread	  to	  
unstable	  nearby	  governments	  such	  as	  Brazil,	  Peru,	  Argentina,	  and	  Brazil	  –	  the	  United	  
States	  government	  actively	  sought	  to	  prevent	  Allende	  from	  taking	  power.	  	  Initially,	  these	  
CIA	  operations	  were	  successful.	  	  As	  indicated	  in	  the	  report	  of	  the	  Church	  Committee,	  
some	  $3	  million	  of	  taxpayer	  money	  was	  used	  to	  finance	  anti-­‐Allende	  propaganda	  and	  
opposition	  campaigns.1	  	  After	  Allende’s	  successful	  election,	  a	  further	  $8	  million	  was	  
distributed	  by	  the	  CIA	  (in	  only	  3	  years)	  in	  what	  was	  said	  to	  cover	  “a	  broad	  spectrum,	  
from	  simple	  propaganda	  manipulation	  of	  the	  press	  to	  large-­‐scale	  support	  for	  Chilean	  
political	  parties,	  from	  public	  opinion	  polls	  to	  direct	  attempts	  to	  foment	  a	  military	  coup.”2	  
	   The	  United	  States	  did	  not	  participate	  directly	  in	  the	  coup	  d’état	  that	  overthrew	  
Allende,	  and	  for	  many	  years	  the	  level	  of	  involvement	  –	  and	  the	  heights	  to	  which	  
responsibility	  rose	  –	  were	  unclear.	  	  As	  documents	  and	  cables	  became	  declassified,	  such	  
as	  the	  Church	  Committee’s	  findings,	  which	  were	  investigating	  the	  legality	  of	  intelligence	  
gathering	  by	  the	  CIA	  and	  FBI,	  new	  light	  was	  shed	  upon	  what	  exactly	  went	  on	  Chile.	  	  It	  is	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now	  clear	  that	  the	  U.S.	  engaged	  in	  every	  activity	  save	  direct	  military	  action	  to	  destabilize	  
Allende.	  	  The	  CIA	  promoted,	  even	  encouraged,	  a	  military	  coup,	  but	  would	  not	  go	  so	  far	  
as	  to	  directly	  participate	  in	  such	  a	  military	  action.	  	  Rather,	  the	  CIA,	  under	  direct	  orders	  
from	  Nixon	  and	  Kissinger,	  meticulously	  dismantled	  Allende’s	  support	  base	  and	  
intentionally	  created	  chaos	  such	  that	  the	  Chilean	  people	  and	  military	  were	  willing	  to	  
support	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  coup	  themselves.	  	  In	  a	  sense,	  the	  U.S.	  provided	  the	  weapons	  and	  
the	  impetus	  to	  pull	  the	  trigger.	  	  A	  good	  example	  of	  how	  the	  CIA	  was	  able	  to	  incubate	  the	  
conditions	  that	  led	  to	  the	  coup	  without	  having	  to	  fire	  a	  weapon,	  or	  even	  make	  
themselves	  known,	  is	  found	  in	  the	  Church	  report:	  
With	  regard	  to	  the	  truckers'	  strike,	  two	  facts	  are	  undisputed.	  First,	  the	  40	  
Committee	  did	  not	  approve	  any	  funds	  to	  be	  given	  directly	  to	  the	  strikers.	  
Second,	  all	  observers	  agree	  that	  the	  two	  lengthy	  strikes	  (the	  second	  lasted	  from	  
July	  13,	  1973	  until	  the	  September	  11	  coup)	  could	  not	  have	  been	  maintained	  on	  
the	  basis	  of	  union	  funds,	  It	  remains	  unclear	  whether	  or	  to	  what	  extent	  CIA	  funds	  
passed	  to	  opposition	  parties	  may	  have	  been	  siphoned	  off	  to	  support	  strikes.	  It	  is	  
clear	  that	  anti-­‐government	  strikers	  were	  actively	  supported	  by	  several	  of	  the	  
private	  sector	  groups	  which	  received	  CIA	  funds.	  There	  were	  extensive	  links	  
between	  these	  private	  sector	  organizations	  and	  the	  groups	  which	  coordinated	  
and	  implemented	  the	  strikes.	  In	  November	  1972	  the	  CIA	  learned	  that	  one	  private	  
sector	  group	  had	  passed	  $2,800	  directly	  to	  strikers,	  contrary	  to	  the	  Agency's	  
ground	  rules.	  The	  CIA	  rebuked	  the	  group	  but	  nevertheless	  passed	  it	  additional	  
money	  the	  next	  month.3	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In	  other	  words,	  the	  CIA	  was	  very	  good	  at	  covering	  its	  tracks,	  avoiding	  a	  large	  
international	  outcry	  at	  such	  malevolent	  meddling	  by	  only	  supporting	  those	  who	  in	  turn	  
supported	  the	  strike.	  	  In	  fact,	  the	  truckers’	  strike	  was	  key	  to	  permanently	  turning	  
popular	  opinion	  against	  Allende.	  	  After	  five	  weeks	  of	  striking,	  the	  truckers	  were	  
estimated	  to	  have	  caused	  losses	  of	  $100	  million	  to	  the	  Chilean	  economy,	  most	  of	  which	  
came	  from	  a	  lack	  of	  basic	  goods	  in	  shops.	  	  Additionally,	  Chile’s	  economy	  was	  collapsing	  
from	  all	  sides	  as	  pressures	  from	  the	  drying	  up	  of	  essential	  foreign	  funds	  came	  to	  a	  head	  
–	  a	  much	  less	  covert	  method	  of	  warfare	  organized	  by	  the	  United	  States.	  	  As	  Paul	  
Sigmund	  reported,	  the	  inflation	  rate	  for	  1972	  had	  reached	  323	  percent.	  By	  1973,	  the	  
deficit	  reached	  53	  percent	  of	  the	  government	  budget.	  	  Money	  supply	  rose	  by	  3,400	  
percent	  during	  Allende’s	  three	  years	  in	  power.	  	  Industrial	  production	  dropped	  between	  
six	  and	  eight	  percent.	  	  Between	  1972	  and	  1973,	  there	  was	  a	  22	  percent	  drop	  in	  
agricultural	  production.	  	  The	  balance	  of	  payments	  deficit	  under	  Allende	  rose	  by	  nearly	  
$1.25	  million	  a	  day.4	  	  Shops	  continually	  had	  shortages,	  and	  a	  major	  black	  market	  
developed.	  	  The	  upper	  and	  middle-­‐classes,	  who	  were	  used	  to	  a	  steady	  supply	  of	  goods,	  
directed	  their	  anger	  towards	  Allende,	  not	  knowing	  that	  a	  faraway	  government	  was	  
actually	  largely	  responsible	  for	  their	  economic	  woes.	  
It	  is	  important	  to	  recognize	  the	  level	  at	  which	  commercial	  interests	  dictated	  
foreign	  policy	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  	  As	  stated	  earlier	  in	  this	  paper,	  it	  was	  fear	  of	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nationalizations	  of	  American	  business	  interests	  that	  truly	  drove	  the	  U.S.’s	  aggressive	  
rhetoric	  against	  communism	  developing	  in	  the	  Americas.	  	  As	  Joseph	  Collins	  remarked:	  	  
The	  introduction	  in	  August,	  1971	  of	  Nixon’s	  New	  Economic	  Policy	  shifted	  
responsibility	  for	  the	  formulation	  of	  foreign	  policy	  towards	  Latin	  America	  from	  
the	  State	  Department	  to	  the	  Treasury	  Department…	  70	  percent	  of	  the	  key	  policy	  
makers	  during	  a	  five-­‐year	  period	  were	  from	  the	  world	  of	  corporate	  business	  
prior	  to	  taking	  office.5	  
Yet	  economic	  dominance	  is	  only	  one	  of	  the	  ways	  the	  United	  States	  has	  historically	  
maintained	  hegemony	  in	  Latin	  America.	  	  It	  has	  also	  been	  the	  pattern	  that	  the	  U.S.	  only	  
has	  allowed	  political	  leaders	  that	  are	  friendly	  to	  the	  U.S.	  to	  remain	  in	  power.	  	  Such	  
leaders	  would	  be	  expected	  to	  grant	  immunity	  to	  American	  operatives	  inside	  their	  
countries,	  allow	  for	  a	  major	  American	  military	  presence,	  and	  permit	  an	  American	  
monopoly	  on	  foreign	  investment	  and	  trade.	  	  Any	  leader,	  or	  individual	  striving	  for	  
political	  power,	  who	  the	  U.S.	  feared	  would	  threaten	  any	  aspect	  of	  American	  hegemony	  
was	  labeled	  an	  enemy.	  	  On	  many	  occasions,	  the	  U.S.	  has	  resorted	  to	  direct	  military	  
involvement	  to	  oust	  a	  defiant	  leader.	  	  Other	  times,	  covert	  operations	  organized	  and	  
executed	  by	  the	  CIA	  were	  sufficient.	  	  What	  is	  clear	  is	  that	  since	  the	  United	  States	  has	  
operated	  on	  an	  international	  level,	  the	  decision-­‐making	  process	  behind	  these	  
hegemonic	  dominance	  maneuvers	  led	  all	  the	  way	  up	  to	  the	  President.	  	  Whether	  the	  
means	  to	  achieving	  America’s	  goals	  involved	  installing	  a	  military	  ruler,	  like	  General	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  Chilean	  Democracy:	  An	  IDOC	  Dossier	  On	  
The	  Coup	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  Its	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  Laurence	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  York:	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  Press,	  1974),	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Pinochet,	  who	  engaged	  in	  purging	  campaigns	  murdering	  thousands	  of	  supposed	  leftists,	  
was	  a	  non-­‐issue.	  
President	  Nixon,	  like	  nearly	  every	  president	  before	  him,	  used	  fear	  tactics	  to	  
justify	  his	  actions	  in	  meddling	  with	  Latin	  America.	  	  The	  Monroe,	  Truman,	  Johnson,	  and	  
Nixon	  doctrines,	  as	  discussed	  earlier	  in	  this	  paper,	  were	  all	  thinly-­‐veiled	  proclamations	  
of	  the	  United	  States’	  overt	  and	  singular	  hegemony	  over	  all	  of	  the	  Western	  Hemisphere.	  	  
Supposed	  fears	  of	  Allende	  creating	  a	  military	  alliance	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  recognizing	  
and	  allying	  with	  Communist	  Cuba,	  or	  creating	  a	  haven	  within	  South	  America	  for	  leftist	  
militants	  were	  not	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  United	  States’	  actions	  in	  Chile.	  	  Rather,	  it	  was	  the	  fear	  
that	  nationalization,	  increasing	  calls	  for	  economic	  independence	  from	  America,	  and	  
flaunting	  Chile’s	  democratically-­‐installed	  socialist	  government	  were	  major	  threats	  to	  
U.S.	  dominance	  in	  the	  region	  –	  politically,	  economically,	  and	  symbolically.	  	  As	  stated	  in	  
the	  Church	  report,	  Allende’s	  ties	  with	  Cuba	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  were	  agreeable	  at	  
best,	  and	  there	  was	  never	  a	  threat	  of	  military	  coordination.	  	  Further,	  the	  State	  
Department	  had	  declared	  as	  early	  as	  1971:	  
Allende	  would	  be	  cautious	  in	  providing	  assistance	  to	  extremists	  for	  fear	  of	  
provoking	  a	  military	  reaction	  in	  his	  own	  country…	  Contrary	  to	  some	  earlier	  
indications	  that	  Allende	  might	  provide	  clandestine	  assistance	  to	  neighboring	  
insurgency	  movements,	  evidence	  to	  date	  suggested	  that	  he	  had	  been	  sensitive	  
to	  the	  concerns	  of	  neighboring	  governments	  and	  had	  sought	  to	  avoid	  action	  
which	  would	  strain	  bilateral	  relations.6	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  “Church	  Report:	  Covert	  Action	  in	  Chile	  1963-­‐1973.”	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   This	  pattern	  of	  American	  action	  continues	  today,	  though	  the	  arena	  and	  methods	  
have	  changed	  slightly.	  	  Latin	  America	  is	  now	  mostly	  in	  the	  pocket	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  
though	  there	  have	  been	  some	  defiant	  leaders	  there	  in	  recent	  years,	  mainly	  in	  
Venezuela.	  	  Now,	  the	  U.S.	  supports	  repressive	  governments	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  in	  
exchange	  for	  oil	  and	  land	  for	  military	  bases,	  such	  as	  in	  Bahrain.	  	  In	  the	  face	  of	  popular	  
uprisings,	  during	  which	  the	  government	  of	  Bahrain	  has	  slaughtered	  peacefully-­‐
demonstrating	  civilians,	  the	  United	  States	  has	  maintained	  its	  Navy	  Fifth	  Fleet	  and	  
Central	  Command	  in	  the	  country,	  lending	  legitimacy	  to	  yet	  another	  brutal,	  non-­‐
democratic	  regime	  in	  exchange	  for	  regional	  dominance.7	  	  Though	  the	  examples	  in	  this	  
paper	  are	  limited	  to	  Latin	  America,	  the	  geo-­‐political	  region	  closest	  to	  the	  United	  States,	  
the	  stories	  told	  have	  taken	  place	  in	  every	  region	  of	  the	  world	  for	  centuries.	  	  The	  United	  
States	  is	  history’s	  most	  recent	  major	  colonial	  power,	  and	  will	  continue	  to	  engage	  in	  less	  
than	  honorable	  tactics	  to	  maintain	  its	  coveted	  supremacy.	  	  For	  every	  war	  we	  read	  about	  
on	  the	  news,	  there	  are	  undoubtedly	  numerous	  other	  covert	  wars,	  of	  which	  we	  may	  not	  
learn	  for	  decades.	  
	  
“The	  20th	  century	  has	  been	  characterized	  by	  three	  developments	  of	  great	  
political	  importance:	  The	  growth	  of	  democracy,	  the	  growth	  of	  corporate	  power,	  and	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





growth	  of	  corporate	  propaganda	  as	  a	  means	  of	  protecting	  corporate	  power	  against	  
democracy.”	  –	  Alex	  Carey	  
	   “Of	  all	  forms	  of	  government	  and	  society,	  those	  of	  free	  men	  and	  women	  are	  in	  
many	  respects	  the	  most	  brittle.	  They	  give	  the	  fullest	  freedom	  for	  activities	  of	  private	  
persons	  and	  groups	  who	  often	  identify	  their	  own	  interests,	  essentially	  selfish,	  with	  the	  
general	  welfare.”	  –	  Dorothy	  Thompson	  
	   	  “It	  is	  in	  the	  nature	  of	  imperialism	  that	  citizens	  of	  the	  imperial	  power	  are	  always	  
among	  the	  last	  to	  know-­‐-­‐or	  care-­‐-­‐about	  circumstances	  in	  the	  colonies.”	  –	  Bertrand	  
Russell,	  from	  the	  1967	  International	  War	  Crimes	  Tribunal
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